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Essays in corporate governance 
Pedram Fardnia, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2020 
Corporate governance is a heavily researched area in the finance literature, with previous 
studies exploring a multitude of variables that describe a firm’s board structure, management, 
compensation, etc., and how they affect corporate decisions, firm performance, and various 
other aspects of corporate life. Corporate governance has important implications for nearly all 
business entities, yet many research questions within the field still remain unaddressed.  
In the first part of my thesis, I explore the relation between corporate governance practices 
and shareholder litigation. At the same time, I explore whether firms improve any shortcomings 
in their governance structure and/or governance practices post-litigation. We find evidence that 
variables that describe a firm’s corporate governance, the compensation of its CEO, as well as 
the CEO’s characteristics have a significant influence on the firm’s litigation risk. Our results 
further show that, after a lawsuit, sued firms tend to improve their corporate governance and 
the proportion of their independent directors. In summary, our results provide important 
insights into the role of ex-ante active monitoring (via the board of directors) versus ex-post 
passive monitoring (via shareholder litigation), and how litigation as a passive monitoring 
device can cause firms to improve their active monitoring. 
In another research, I choose the aviation industry and examine the potential effects 
corporate governance policies may have on the safety record of that industry. Pilot errors and 
mechanical failures, which are responsible for 75% of all accidents, are, to some extent, 
preventable because they relate to the way an airline company is managed. My findings reveal 
that airline safety is significantly affected by a series of firm-level characteristics that describe 
an airline’s governance as well as its financial well-being. In addition, I find that airline safety 
is affected by a variety of country-level factors that characterize the legal, institutional, and 
economic environment of a given country, as well as its air transport infrastructure. The results 
of this study have important policy implications for both the airline industry and regulators. To 
allocate resources more efficiently, regulators may find it beneficial to focus their supervision 
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In this paper, we investigate whether a firm’s corporate governance characteristics affect its 
likelihood of being sued in a shareholder class action lawsuit after controlling for known 
determinants of shareholder litigation based on the extant literature. In addition, we explore 
whether shareholder litigation causes firms to overhaul and improve their corporate governance 
practices. We find evidence that variables that describe a firm’s corporate governance, the 
compensation of its CEO, as well as the CEO’s characteristics have a significant influence on 
the firm’s litigation risk. Specifically, a firm’s likelihood of being sued depends on board 
variables, including its board size, board independence, the size of the nominating committee, 
nominating committee independence, and CEO/chairman duality. In addition, firms whose 
CEOs have longer tenure or serve in a dual CEO/chairman role are more likely to be sued. Our 
results further show that, after a lawsuit, sued firms tend to improve their corporate governance 
and the proportion of their independent directors. In addition, we document that the accounting 
performance of sued firms decreases two years after a given lawsuit; however, if sued firms 
improve their governance, their accounting performance improves as well. In summary, our 
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results provide important insights into the role of ex-ante active monitoring (via the board of 
directors) versus ex-post passive monitoring (via shareholder litigation), and how litigation as 
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate scandals occur frequently in the U.S., and often prompt practitioners and scholars 
to question the effectiveness of the corporate governance standards U.S. firms employ either 
voluntarily or in adherence to government regulations. Popular opinion is that managerial fraud 
and the associated accounting and/or financial scandals are the result of a deficiency in 
corporate governance, which explains why corporate governance has become the most 
discussed topic in the finance literature. For example, a 2018 Wall Street Journal article1 looks 
into the failure of Wynn Resorts, the biggest casino and resort in Las Vegas. The author reports 
that after a series of sexual misconduct allegations against Steve Wynn, chairman and CEO of 
the company, shares of Wynn Resorts plunged drastically. Investigations into the matter by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uncovered serious corporate governance 
problems related to the company’s board. The resultant report suggests that because of a lack 
of diversity and independence on the Wynn Resorts board, the company ranks last in corporate 
governance quality when compared to its peers and that the lack of active internal monitoring 
caused the firm’s troubles.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a response to similar scandals (surrounding such firms 
as Enron and WorldCom, among many others) that shook the corporate landscape in the early 
2000s. Congress passed the Act in an attempt to improve the quality of corporate governance 
in U.S. based corporations. A common finding of studies that explore the consequences of 
shareholder litigation is that corporate scandals result in considerable valuation losses for the 
affected firms (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Bernile and Jarrell, 2009; Chen, 2016); with a large 
proportion of the losses being linked to reputational costs for sued firms. Most shareholder 
class actions are filed under Section 10-b5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act which protects 
investors against outright fraudulent practices but also permits shareholders to file a lawsuit 
against managers who appear to act in their personal (rather than the shareholders’) interest. 
For instance, a 2019 article by the Wall Street Journal2 studies the lawsuit filed by Boaz 
Weinstein, the manager of a $1.7 billion hedge fund. Weinstein sued BlackRock Inc., the 
world’s largest asset manager, arguing that they blocked outsiders from gaining board seats at 
three of its funds. The article’s author alleges that corporate governance failures were the 
culprit for the lawsuit. 
 
1 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-board-of-wynn-resorts-needs-to-go-too-1518042289 for details 
2 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/boaz-weinstein-sues-blackrock-alleging-corporate-governance-failings-
11559746961 for details 
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The 2001 Enron Corporation case3 epitomizes the issue of improper corporate governance. 
In 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy because shareholders discovered that the management, 
acting in their self-interest, had fabricated accounting reports that inflated the firm’s 
performance. Based on Stanford University’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(http://securities.stanford.edu), from 1996 to 2019, there have been 2,419 settlements worth 
more than $98 billion in the U.S.; the Enron scandal resulted in the largest settlement in the 
database’s history, worth more than $7 billion. 
 The plaintiff parties in securities class action lawsuits frequently argue that corporate 
governance failures allowed management to defraud investors. As such, it is reasonable to 
assume that good governance practices should be associated with less shareholder litigation, 
whereas bad practices should be linked to more lawsuits. This inspires our empirical research 
questions: Do a firm’s corporate governance practices have predictive power with regard to 
class action lawsuits? And: Do firms change their corporate governance practices after being 
sued? To the best of our knowledge, our study is among the first to answer these two questions 
using a large number of governance measures. 
 
Because of the significant stock price losses typically associated with a lawsuit, there has 
been considerable interest among academics and practitioners in the factors that drive securities 
class action lawsuits (Coles et al., 1994; 1998; Uzun et al., 2004; Peng and Roell, 2007; Jones 
and Wu, 2010). Other studies have closely looked at corporate governance changes after 
lawsuits and the ways firms have tried to improve their corporate governance practices after 
lawsuits (Agarwal et al., 1999; Minnick et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2017). 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between corporate governance practices and 
litigation risk. We investigate the determinants of a firm’s litigation risk using a series of logit 
models while controlling for known factors based on the existing literature. Because lawsuits 
lead to significant valuation losses for investors, and because both the public and the firm’s 
shareholders tend to exert pressure on firms to reform their governance practices following a 
lawsuit, we also explore the aftermath of securities class action lawsuits. Specifically, we 
examine how a lawsuit affects a firm’s corporate governance characteristics and performance 
by examining post-litigation changes in the firm’s governance index, its board structure, and 
ROA. 
 
3 See http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-case.html?id=102098 for details 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature and 
develops our hypotheses, Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection process, Section 
4 introduces our methodology and presents the empirical results of our regression analysis, 
Section 5 discusses the results for a series of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Our study contributes to two substantial strands of the literature that examine (1) the 
determinants of lawsuits, and (2) the governance changes after lawsuits. Scholars have studied 
different aspects of corporate governance practices in relation to lawsuits, including a firm’s 
compensation policy, board structure, ownership structure, and CEO characteristics, which we 
review in this section. 
2.1  Compensation Policy 
Many firms use stock options in executive compensation because, on one hand, stock 
options tend to link executive compensation with changes in shareholders’ wealth. As a result, 
the use of stock options as part of managerial remuneration is perceived to increase 
shareholders’ wealth while reducing agency problems. On the other hand, critics of stock 
options have argued that stock options motivate managers to take on additional risk and 
manipulate the company’s stock price in an attempt to reap a higher value of their options. 
Denis et al. (2006) test the relationship between securities fraud allegations and a firm’s 
compensation structure and find a significant positive relationship between the likelihood of 
litigation and a measure of executive stock option incentives. In another study, Peng and Roell 
(2007) test the association between executive options pay and the likelihood of litigation and 
find that incentive pay in the form of options increases the probability of securities class action 
litigation. 
2.2  Board Structure 
The board of directors is responsible for monitoring the actions of the CEO and the 
management team on behalf of shareholders. Ideally, the board provides full supervision and 
reduces agency problems; however, in many firms, boards may – for various reasons examined 
herein – not provide enough managerial oversight.  
Examining the relation between board composition and firm performance is an important 
topic in the corporate governance literature. Many scholars argue that the composition of the 
board of directors affects its effectiveness. The literature generally offers two opposing views 
regarding the board of directors’ effectiveness on corporate governance, particularly with 
respect to the membership of inside versus outside directors: the first view states that inside 
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directors follow managers’ decisions and act in favor of CEOs, not shareholders; the opposing 
view claims that insiders are highly skilled decision-makers who enhance board monitoring 
power over a CEO, and therefore lead rather than follow other board members. In a litigation 
context, Helland and Sykuta (2005) suggest that sued firms have smaller boards and a higher 
proportion of insider directors than non-sued firms. Similarly, Uzun et al. (2004) report that 
firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board of directors, the board’s audit, and the 
compensation committees are less likely to experience managerial fraud. In related research, 
Minnick et al. (2015) examine changes in governance, including board composition, that occur 
after a lawsuit. They report that firms tend to undergo considerable changes in corporate 
governance and that these changes improve the firm’s performance in the years following the 
lawsuit. 
2.3  Governance Index 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct an index to proxy for the level of shareholder 
rights. Many scholars use the Gompers et al. index as a proxy for the balance of power between 
managers and shareholders. Most closely related to our study, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) use 
the index to measure the effect of a firm’s governance characteristics on the firm’s litigation 
risk, finding that weak governance significantly increases the likelihood of a lawsuit. In another 
study, Kalchev (2008) hypothesizes that the likelihood of a lawsuit decreases as a result of 
better-quality corporate governance. He constructs a governance index based on a series of 
principal components. Contrary to Gompers et al. (2003), he assigns different weights to the 
variables and finds evidence that the quality of corporate governance predicts the likelihood of 
shareholder litigation. 
2.4  Ownership Structure  
Another effective governance mechanism that has been shown to successfully reduce 
agency problems is a firm’s equity ownership structure, i.e., the identities of investors and the 
magnitude of their positions. The recent literature regarding shareholder litigation proposes 
that institutional investors can affect a firm’s litigation risk. Mohan (2007) claims that firms 
with lower institutional holdings are more likely to be sued. In contrast, Denis et al. (2006) find 
no significant relationship between institutional ownership or block ownership and the 
likelihood of fraud allegations; however, in firms with higher institutional ownership, they 
report a strong positive relation between option intensity and the probability of being sued. 
Finally, several studies have examined the effect of CEO stock ownership on a firm’s 
decisions. For instance, Baker and Mueller (2002) study the determinants of firms’ R&D 
spending, including the CEOs’ stock ownership of these firms. They expect a positive 
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relationship between a firm’s R&D expenditures and the extent of its CEO’s stock ownership, 
showing that the higher the CEO’s stock ownership, the higher the firm’s R&D expenditures. 
As an extension, they argue that this also leads to a higher probability of fraud because research 
and development is risky due to its long-term objectives and high failure rates. Conversely, 
agency theory suggests that the increased at-risk wealth of CEOs encourages managers to align 
their objectives with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, hence lowering the 
likelihood of a shareholder lawsuit. Therefore, the effect of CEO stock ownership on the 
probability of a lawsuit is inconclusive. 
2.5  Hypotheses 
Corporate governance includes a range of issues pertaining to the direction and management 
of firms. In general, strong corporate governance is both legally mandated and, in most firms, 
voluntarily pursued, thereby involving both management compliance and discretionary 
judgment. As outlined in our literature review, high-quality corporate governance, and the 
associated active monitoring of the firm’s management, has been associated with numerous 
benefits in prior studies. As an extension of this discussion, we expect that poor active 
monitoring increases the need for passive monitoring or, in our context, shareholder litigation. 
We thus postulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with poor corporate governance are more likely to be sued. 
To test this hypothesis, we construct an index similar to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) governance index to measure the governance quality of firms, where a high governance 
index indicates weak governance. Another aspect of corporate governance that we consider in 
this study relates to the characteristics of the board of directors. Many scholars have tested the 
managerial power hypothesis, which states that the managers’ influence over the board of 
directors allows the former to extract rent (Dechow et al., 1996; Karpoff et al., 1996; Weisbach, 
1988; Mauslis et al., 2011). The assumption is that by making boards more independent from 
management, the possibility of the aforementioned exploitations decreases, and hence a firm’s 
corporate governance improves. In another study, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) test the 
endogenous board hypothesis, which states that lawsuits are a threat to a firm and its continued 
existence, therefore causing the board’s outside directors to spend more time monitoring the 
company. The authors also find a significant decline in outside directorships following a 
lawsuit as outside board members seek associations with ‘better’ firms; conversely, Helland 
(2006) shows that the number of board seats occupied by outside directors increases after a 
firm is sued, likely due to the pressure a lawsuit exerts on a sued firm’s board. 
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Therefore, the literature suggests that the size and structure of the board influence the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms. Weisbach (1988) finds evidence that a high 
percentage of outsiders on the board of directors will be more concerned about shareholder 
benefits and firm performance than a board with a low percentage of outsiders on the board. In 
addition, Yermack (1996) reports that firms with small boards are more effective and perform 
better.  
Other scholars (e.g., Strahan, 1998; Niehaus and Roth, 1999; Ferris et al., 2007) examine 
the board structure following a lawsuit. Their findings confirm that firms implement value-
enhancing improvements in corporate governance in the aftermath of a lawsuit. They argue 
that this upturn is partially caused by the fact that, following a lawsuit, the current CEO of a 
sued firm tries to improve the firm’s corporate governance practices to signal to shareholders 
and directors that the firm will recover from the lawsuit-induced valuation loss. In line with 
these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with larger boards are more likely to be sued. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with less independent boards are more likely to be sued. 
Hypothesis 2c: Firms with less independent nominating committees are more likely to be sued. 
We use several variables to proxy for the quality of a firm’s corporate governance 
mechanisms. Specifically, based on the literature, we create the following variables related to 
the board of directors: the board size, the ratio of independent directors, the ratio of insiders 
who hold independent outside directorships, the ratio of independent directors who are also 
part of the nominating committee, the ratio of board members who sit on more than one board, 
the ratio of nominating committee members, a CEO/chairman duality dummy, and the 
proportion of non-employee block holders. 
 
We define board size as the number of directors serving on the board of a firm and use this 
value as the denominator of other governance ratios to scale those values to a range between 0 
and 1. Following Masulis and Mobs (2011), we define a unique variable to develop a 
differentiation method among executives. Specifically, we refer to inside directors with outside 
directorship(s) as externally certified inside directors (CIDs)4 and postulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
4   For consistency with the literature, we exclude appointments to affiliated insiders and insiders with family 
connections and only include independent outside directorships in our definition of CIDs. 
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Hypothesis 3: Firms with a higher proportion of externally certified inside directors (CIDs) 
are less likely to be sued. 
When examining the influence of CEO characteristics on firm performance and corporate 
decisions, Baker and Mueller (2002) find that R&D spending is higher when CEOs are 
younger. They explain their findings by showing that older CEOs are more conservative and 
tend to be more risk-averse in the management of their company, compared to younger CEOs. 
Denis et al. (2006) find that the age of the CEO is lower in firms that committed fraud and that 
the difference is statistically significant, in turn also suggesting that firms with younger CEOs 
are more likely to be involved in a lawsuit. In contrast, Nelson (2005) finds no relationship 
between CEO age, tenure, and governance changes. This prompts our fourth hypothesis, again 
with two sub-hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms with older CEOs are less likely to be sued. 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms with CEOs who have long tenure are less likely to be sued. 
Another factor that affects the active monitoring ability of a firm is its ownership structure. 
High analyst coverage, as well as a large portion of institutional investors, are both considered 
as positive influences for a firm’s monitoring ability. Mohan (2004) finds that firms with large 
institutional block holders are less likely to be sued, referring to the monitoring role of 
institutional investors. In line with this literature, we determine Hypotheses 5a and 5b as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher institutional ownership are less likely to be sued. 
Murphy (1999) summarizes the empirical and theoretical research in the literature on 
executive compensation. Although there are various executive compensation packages across 
firms and industries, most CEO pay packages contain four components: a base salary, an annual 
performance bonus, stock options, and long-term incentive plans (restricted shares, etc.). The 
base salary is a fixed component in executive contracts, and if it comprises a dominant portion 
of a CEO’s compensation package, executives will avoid taking on unnecessary additional 
risks, which would otherwise increase the other components of their compensation package. In 
the end, a higher proportion of fixed compensation should, therefore, reduce the chances of 
being sued because of the reduced managerial risk taking. 
In the empirical research literature, scholars have linked executive stock options to both 
earnings and stock price manipulations. In addition, stock option incentive plans have been 
shown to increase the likelihood of a firm being sued (Peng and Roell, 2008; Jones and Wu, 
2010). In theory, both stock options and long-term incentive plans, such as restricted shares, 
are meant to align managerial incentives with shareholder interests. This paper attempts to 
 10 
determine which of these two effects dominates in practice and whether stock option incentive 
plans increase or decrease the likelihood of a lawsuit. We hypothesize the following links 
between CEO compensation and a firm’s litigation likelihood: 
Hypothesis 6a: Firms whose CEOs receive a higher proportion of performance-based 
compensation are more likely to be sued. 
Hypothesis 6b: Firms whose CEOs receive a higher proportion of compensation from long-
term incentive plans are more likely to be sued. 
There are many papers in the financial and legal literature that investigate what happens 
after a firm has been sued (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Volker 
Laux, 2010; Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Hutton et al., 2014; Minnick et al., 2015; Walker et al., 
2017). While lawsuits may have adverse effects on a firm as well as its managers and board 
members, they may also improve its corporate governance characteristics. For instance, McTier 
and Wald (2011) document various changes in firm policy following a lawsuit, all in 
accordance with a reduction in agency costs. Similarly, Ferris et al. (2007) show improvements 
in several governance measures after derivative lawsuits. In another study, Helland (2006) 
finds that after a lawsuit, the number of outside directors in the corporation’s board increases. 
Our paper elucidates this matter by examining developments in our governance measures 
following a lawsuit. We expect that, following a lawsuit, firms revise their board structure and 
corporate governance policies in response to public and shareholder pressure, and to avoid 
future lawsuits. 
Hypothesis 7a: Following a lawsuit, firms will improve their governance practices. 
Hypothesis 7b: Following a lawsuit, firms will improve their board structure. 
3. Methodology and Data Description 
3.1  Model Specification and Empirical Approach 
We follow the extant literature and employ a series of logit regression models to identify 
the determinants of a firm’s litigation risk. In addition, when examining the consequences of 
shareholder class action lawsuits, we use a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
with a firm’s accounting performance and various governance measures as dependent 
variables. To address the potential endogeneity concerns which are common in corporate 
governance research, we estimate our models using different methods, including an 
instrumental variable Probit regression.  
Our main logit regression model can be specified as follows: 





𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable that identifies whether a firm was sued in a securities class action 
lawsuit (1=yes, 0=no),  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 represent a set of variables that measure a firm’s corporate 
governance, including the G-index,  board size, the ratio of independent directors, the ratio of 
directors holding more than 1 seat, the ratio of non-employee block holders, a CEO/chairman 
duality dummy, and  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 are a set of variables that have previously been associated with 
shareholder class action litigation, including a firm’s book-to-market ratio, ROA, intangible 
assets, leverage, dividend payout ratio, price volatility, stock turnover, and the firm’s prior 
return. 
We estimate the above regression for our sample of sued firms and a sample of propensity 
score-matched non-sued firms to avoid selection biases in our sample. For each sued and non-
sued firm, we collect information from various different databases, including COMPUSTAT, 
CRSP, ISS Directors, ISS Governance, Execucomp, IBES, and Thompson 13f. Specifically, 
we create a sample of firm-year observations by merging the various databases (see our 
discussion below regarding our filtering criteria and our treatment of firms with missing 
information).  
 
In our propensity score matching approach, our treatment variable is a dummy that equals 
one if a firm was sued. We use the firm’s size and book-to-market ratio as matching criteria. 
To address potential endogeneity concerns, we estimate our models using an instrumental 
variable Probit regression. Specifically, we first regress the endogenous covariate on a set of 
variables. We then use an instrumental variable Probit model as a control function estimator 
for two reasons: first, our dependent variable is a dummy variable—being sued or not sued—
and second, our endogenous covariate in this model is a continuous variable—the ratio of 
certified inside directors. 
Finally, we use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an exogenous shock to the composition 
of many U.S. boards of directors because it forced them to replace some of their inside directors 
with outside directors. Our instrumental variable is correlated with our endogenous variable 
but uncorrelated with our regression’s error term. To test the validity of our instrumented 
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variable, we run a Wald test for exogeneity and reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, 
confirming our instrumental variable validity. 
 
When examining the aftermath of lawsuits, our main models can be specified as follows: 
 




∆ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖, ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖) 
 
where: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 is an index that represents the sum of 13 indicators of 
governance quality (see Table A1 for details),  
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 include board size, the ratio of independent directors, 
the ratio of directors holding more than 1 seat, the ratio of non-employee block holders, a 
CEO/chairman duality dummy, and 
𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖 is our aforementioned dummy variable that identifies whether a firm was sued in a 
securities class action lawsuit (1=yes, 0=no). 
Regarding the analysis pertaining to the aftermath of lawsuits, we estimate a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) regression to address potential reverse causality that 
may bias our primary independent variable (the governance index).  
3.2  Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
We collect data on securities class action cases filed against U.S. firms from Stanford 
University’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu). The 
Stanford database features 4,598 lawsuits between January 1996 and 2017. In line with the 
extant literature (Peng and Roell, 2007; 2008; Walker et al., 2018), we exclude lawsuits against 
private firms, firms that trade in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, and open-ended funds. 
We also exclude lawsuits against financial firms (by excluding firms with a standard industry 
classification (SIC) code between 6000 and 6999). Our final sample of lawsuits thus consists 
of 3,728 cases. In addition, depending on our respective models, we exclude a considerable 
number of firms because they are missing information in the databases we consulted for our 
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study. Table 1 provides an overview of our sample formation procedure and outlines the 
number of firms discarded at each step. 
 
*** Move Table 1 About Here *** 
In order to address any concerns regarding potential selection biases, we employ a 
propensity score matching procedure using the nearest neighbour Caliper matching technique 
using a firm’s size and book-to-market ratio to establish a sample of non-treated (non-sued) 
firms that are matched to the firms in our treatment (sued) sample. Hence, our treatment 
variable is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is sued and 0 otherwise.  
3.3  Corporate Governance Data 
We collect corporate governance data from the ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) database. 
Specifically, the ISS data is organized two databases: Directors and Governance. The Directors 
database covers a range of variables related to the structure and practices of the boards of 
directors of S&P 1500 companies, whereas the Governance database provides data on 
corporate governance provisions and classic takeover defences for major U.S. firms. Both the 
Governance and Directors databases are further divided into two sub-samples: Governance and 
Governance Legacy, and Directors and Directors Legacy. 
Prior to the 2007 data year, RiskMetrics conducted the data collection for the Legacy 
databases using a different methodology. For instance, RiskMetrics stored governance 
variables using a 0/1 format and numerical values (in contrast to the ISS methodology which 
used “Yes/No” format and qualitative values). After the 2007 data year, ISS changed its data 
collection methodology and implemented the new Directors and Governance databases. Due 
to this change in methodology, we modify several variables to keep all data in a consistent 
format. For example, if a variable is stored in “YES/NO” format in the Director and/or 
Governance databases and as 1/0 format in Legacy, we change all variables saved in the 
YES/NO format into a 1/0 format. 
Similarly, in 2007, the ISS also made significant changes to their data sources and 
methodology used to construct their Governance database. As a result, many of the inputs 
needed to calculate the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (G Index) are no 
longer available. Therefore, we build a governance index similar to the G Index using a subset 
of continuously available variables. In addition, following the literature (cf., Bebchuk et al., 
2008), we fill in data for missing years by forward-projecting the most recent available ISS 
Legacy and Governance data. For instance, ISS Governance data from 1995 is used for 1996.  
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Our governance index (G.I.) thus consists of 13 provisions that are available throughout 
most of the sample period in both the Legacy and Governance databases. The G.I. ranges from 
-2 to 11, with higher scores representing poorer corporate governance quality. The G.I. can be 
as low as -2 because of two provisions that, if present, have a positive effect on the governance 
quality of a firm, therefore lowering the G.I. (see Table A1 in the Appendix for more details). 
Specifically, we assign a value of -1 to the provisions cumulative voting and confidential voting 
(secret ballots) if they exist, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 shows the list of variables used in the 
calculation of our G.I. These include Limits to the ability to amend the charter, Limits to the 
ability to amend bylaws, Limits to the ability to act by written consent, and Limits to the ability 
to call a special meeting. We replace any missing values of the aforementioned variables with 
one if the values of Vote % required to amend charter, Vote % required to amend bylaws, Vote 
% required for written consent, and Vote % required to call special meeting, respectively, are 
above 66.66%.  
*** Move Table 2 About Here *** 
3.4  Execucomp, 13f Thompson Reuters, I/B/E/S, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP 
We collect variables on CEO compensation from Execucomp, basing our analysis on four 
specific variables: CEO salary compensation (i.e., the value of the CEO’s base salary over total 
compensation), CEO long-term incentive plan compensation (the value of long-term incentive 
programs over total compensation), CEO bonus compensation (the value of bonuses over total 
compensation), and CEO options compensation (the value of executive stock options over total 
compensation). In addition, we collect ownership data, such as institutional investor ownership, 
the number of institutional owners, and the number of institutional block owners, from the 
Thompson database.  
We define analyst coverage as the number of analysts covering the firm on a given date, 
which we collect from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). All other variables, 
including the book-to-market ratio, ROA, intangible assets, leverage, dividend payout ratio, 
price volatility, stock turnover, buy and hold return, are collected from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. Table A1 in the Appendix contains a detailed description of the variables. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1  Summary Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our sample, divided into two-subsamples based on 
whether or not a firm was sued during our sample period. In the last two columns, we test for 
the equality of means and medians between the two subsamples and report the p-values for 
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both a t-test for the difference in means and a Wilcoxon median test for the difference in 
medians. As expected, the mean and median values of the governance index are significantly 
higher in sued firms than in non-sued firms. Regarding the board structure – again in line with 
our expectations – the mean and median of the ratio of the independent nominating committee 
members is significantly higher for non-sued firms than for sued firms, showing that firms with 
more independent nominating committee members are less likely to face shareholder litigation. 
Also, the mean and median ratio of directors holding more than one seat are significantly 
higher for sued firms than for non-sued firms, showing that firms with busier directors 
(directors who hold more than one seat at the same time) are more likely to become the target 
of a shareholder class action lawsuit. Moreover, sued firms are more likely to have CEOs who 
also serve as chairmen of the board of directors. We argue that in these firms (where the CEOs 
also serve as chairmen), the CEOs have more power over the board, which they may exploit to 
their advantage.  
The mean and median proportional CEO salary compensation are significantly higher for 
the non-sued group than for the sued group, confirming our expectation that a higher fixed 
salary component reduces managerial risk-taking and thus a firm’s litigation risk. The mean 
and median CEO option compensation are significantly higher for the sued group than the non-
sued group. The literature on this subject, which links option compensation to an increased 
likelihood of managerial fraud, can explain this finding. 
 Also, importantly, before we estimate our regressions, we calculate the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between each variable pair. The correlations are reported in an online appendix to 
this study. In order to mitigate multicollinearity concerns, we do not jointly include variables 
in our multivariate analysis whose correlation coefficients exceed a threshold of 0.6 in absolute 
terms.  
*** Move Table 3 About Here *** 
4.2  Results for the PSM Matched Sample  
Table 4 provides the results for our logit regression analysis in which we explore the 
determinants of a firm’s litigation risk after propensity score matching. In all the models, the 
dependent variable is the sued dummy, which equals one if a firm was sued and zero otherwise. 
In the first model, we use the governance index as our primary independent variable and include 
our set of control variables. The coefficient of the governance index is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, showing that if the corporate governance ‘misquality’ of a firm (as measured 
by the G Index) increases, the probability of a firm being sued increases, too. The subsequent 
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models examine other aspects of a firm’s governance and ownership structure. We employ our 
variables of interest in separate tranches to reduce any related multicollinearity concerns. 
In the second model, which focuses on a firm’s board structure, we find that if the ratio of 
independent directors in a firm increases, the likelihood of a firm being sued decreases. The 
respective coefficient is statistically significant. In contrast, board size has a positive but 
insignificant coefficient, providing weak support for the notion that the bigger the board of 
directors, the more likely a firm will be sued. The duality dummy variable is also positive, 
showing that when the CEO of a firm also serves as chairman, the probability of the firm being 
sued increases. This could be due to the CEOs’ extra power to exploit and affect boards to their 
own advantage, thus increasing the probability of a shareholder lawsuit.  
In the third model, we examine how the nominating committee structure affects a firm’s 
litigation risk. The nominating committee is responsible for helping the board of directors with 
its supervising responsibilities regarding the board’s structure. As expected, we find that if the 
nominating committee has an independent director, the likelihood of a firm being sued 
decreases; in contrast, by simply increasing the size of the nominating committee, the 
likelihood of a firm being sued increases. The coefficient of the CEO/chairman duality dummy 
remains positive and insignificant. 
Our fourth model focuses on CEO characteristics as our main independent variables. These 
include the CEO’s age, the CEO’s tenure, and the CEO’s voting power (defined as the 
percentage of votes held by the CEO). The coefficient of Ln (CEO Tenure) is negative but not 
significant, providing weak evidence for the notion that the longer the tenure of a CEO (and 
thereby the higher the CEO’s risk aversion), the less likely a firm will be sued. Finally, in line 
with our CEO/chairman duality results, but now marginally significant at the 10% level, we 
find that the higher the CEO voting power, the higher the probability of the firm being sued. 
Arguably, this is driven by the fact that when a CEO’s voting power increases, the CEO can 
align his/her managerial decisions with their personal interests instead of the shareholders’ 
interests. The coefficient of Ln (CEO Age) is positive (albeit insignificant), weakly indicating 
that firms with older CEOs have a higher likelihood of being sued. 
In the fifth model, we test the potential effects of ownership structure on a firm’s litigation 
risk. We include three different variables to capture the associated monitoring effects for a 
firm: the number of institutional block owners, institutional investor ownership, and the 
number of institutional owners. All variables exhibit negative (albeit insignificant) coefficients, 
providing a weak indication that a higher level of active monitoring by institutional investors 
decreases a firm’s likelihood of being sued. We also include the CEO stock ownership in this 
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model and obtain a positive but insignificant coefficient, hinting to the possibility that higher 
CEO stock ownership increases the likelihood of litigation. 
In the sixth and seventh models, we test how different aspects of a CEO’s compensation 
package affect the likelihood of a lawsuit. To mitigate multicollinearity concerns and ensure a 
sufficient number of observations for each model, we employ two separate regression models 
with different compensation components. Specifically, in model six, we include both the 
CEO’s bonus and option package. The coefficient of the CEO bonus compensation is 
significantly positive, showing that if CEOs are compensated to a large extent by bonuses, the 
firm’s litigation risk increases. This may be driven by the managers acting more in their own 
interest if a larger proportion of their remuneration is performance-based. In the seventh model, 
we include CEO salary compensation (as a proxy for how much of a manager’s compensation 
is fixed) and long-term incentive plan compensation. We obtain insignificant negative 
(positive) coefficients for the two variables, weakly suggesting that if CEOs are remunerated 
to a larger extent via fixed salary (long-term performance-based compensation), the probability 
of a firm being sued decreases (increases). This result is consistent with the notion that 
executives avoid taking unnecessary risks when they have a fixed salary, but increase their risk 
taking when their salary is to a larger extent performance-based.  
*** Move Table 4 About Here *** 
4.3  Addressing Potential Endogeneity  
As an alternative approach to addressing endogeneity in our empirical analysis, we use a 
two-stage Probit instrumental variable model. Here, the ratio of certified inside directors, the 
endogenous covariate, is regressed on a variable correlated with the ratio of certified inside 
directors but completely uncorrelated with the error term of the regression in which we model 
a firm’s likelihood of being sued. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock to 
obtain an instrumented variable for the ratio of certified inside directors. We include a 
Sarbanes-Oxley indicator in our first-stage model, and in the second stage of the Probit 
regression, we utilize the instrumented variable. The ratio of certified inside directors is 
negative and significant in almost all models, suggesting that an increase in the ratio of insider 
directors with outside directorship decreases the Z value of the Probit function. As a result, it 
is less likely that a firm is sued if it has more outside directors.  
Consistent with our main regression, the governance index and the ratio of independent 
directors retain their sign, and the latter stays statistically significant. Furthermore, the duality 
variable in Table 5 now becomes statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that if a 
CEO also serves as chairman, the probability of being sued increases. Similar to our main 
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regression findings, the coefficient of the logged CEO age maintains its sign and also becomes 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with older CEOs have a higher likelihood of being 
sued. Although this finding contrasts with our hypothesis, this inconsistency may be due to the 
perception that older CEOs become more complacent and less likely to initiate critical changes 
when needed, or they may lose touch with emerging corporate governance reforms.  
*** Move Table 5 About Here *** 
In order to test whether industry effects influence our results, we re-run the IV Probit model 
again and add industry dummies that reflect the Fama-French 17 industry classification to our 
models. We obtain very similar results, which are summarized in Table 6. 
*** Move Table 6 About Here *** 
4.4  The Aftermath of Lawsuits 
Table 7 provides results for a series of univariate analyses of selected corporate governance 
characteristics. In Panel A, we compare the mean and median governance characteristics of 
firms one year before the filing of a lawsuit with the characteristics one year after the lawsuit 
and report the results for a t-test (Wilcoxon test) of the significance of differences between the 
two means (medians). Similarly, Panel B of Table 7 provides a comparison of a firm’s 
governance characteristics one year before the lawsuit filing with its characteristics two years 
after the filing. 
Our results in Panel A show that the mean governance index is lower in the year after the 
lawsuits compared to the year prior, with the difference being significant at the 10% level. This 
difference illustrates sued firms’ attempt to improve their governance structure in response to 
litigation. In Panel B, the mean governance index decreases two years after a lawsuit, but the 
difference is no longer significant. More interestingly, the mean ratio of independent directors 
increases after lawsuits in both Panel A and B, with the difference being statistically significant 
in Panel B. Finally, the means ratio of independent nominating committee members increases 
in both panels, with the differences again being statistically significant. Overall, these changes 
suggest that firms tend to improve their corporate governance characteristics (whether 
mandated by derivate lawsuits or voluntarily) in the one to two years after a lawsuit. 
*** Move Table 7 About Here *** 
We summarize the result of our hypotheses regarding the effects of a lawsuit on different 
aspects of a firm in Table 8, examined via a series of multivariate OLS regressions. Panel A 
examines changes from one year prior to a given lawsuit to one year after the lawsuit. Panel B 
considers the changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to two years afterwards. In both panels, 
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we control for changes in ROA, price volatility, intangible assets, leverage, size, book-to-
market ratio, board size, and free cash flow.  
In the first model of Panel A, the coefficient of the sued dummy is negative but insignificant, 
showing that firms change their governance structure one year after being sued. In the second 
model, the change in the ratio of certified inside directors acts as our dependent variable. The 
coefficient of the sued dummy is positive but not significant, providing weak support for the 
notion that decision-makers improve the composition of the board of directors one year after a 
firm faces litigation. The sued dummy is insignificant in most models. Unrelated, but 
interestingly, when examining the effect of litigation on the CEO/chairman duality dummy in 
the last model, the change in the logged CEO age is positively related to the change in duality 
at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that CEOs are more likely to serve in a dual 
CEO/chairman role as they get older. In the same model, the changes in the logged CEO tenure 
also has a significant positive coefficient, suggesting that the longer the CEO’s tenure, the more 
likely they are to serve in a dual CEO/chairman role after a firm was sued.  
In the first model of Panel B, the dependent variable is the changes in the governance index 
from one year before the lawsuit to two years after the lawsuit. The coefficient of the sued 
dummy is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that being sued causes the 
governance index to decrease by 0.680 units two years after the lawsuits. In other words, after 
being sued, firms appear to improve their corporate governance policies, as captured by the 
changes in the governance index. Similar to Panel A, we do not observe any significant effects 
of litigation on other (individual) aspects of a firm’s corporate governance, however. 
*** Move Table 8 About Here *** 
In Table 9, we extend our previous analysis by examining the effect of a lawsuit on a firm’s 
performance. Using the change in a firm’s ROA as the dependent variable in both models, we 
estimate a 2SLS IV regression to address potential reverse causality that may bias our primary 
independent variable (the governance index).  
In Model 1, all changes are calculated using variables one year after the lawsuit minus one 
year before the lawsuit. In Model 2, we employ the same regression model as in Model 1, but 
this time we calculate changes using the variables two years after the lawsuit minus variables 
one year before the lawsuit. Our results in both models show that shareholder class action 
litigation significantly and negatively affects the accounting performance of firms. In both 
models, we also observe negative coefficients for changes in the governance index (significant 
in Model 2), which suggest that a firm’s improvement in its governance index also improves 
its accounting performance.  
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*** Move Table 9 About Here *** 
After estimating our 2SLS IV regressions, we test the validity of our instrumental variables 
in both regressions using a Wald test. Based on the F statistics for both models, we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak.  
5. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we briefly discuss the results of a series of unreported robustness tests 
designed to ensure that our results are not driven by methodological choices and/or our sample 
selection criteria. In a first robustness test intended to rule out the possibility that insiders were 
aware of a forthcoming class action lawsuit, we re-run our main regression models using data 
from one year before the beginning of the class action period (i.e. the period during which the 
fraud allegedly took place) instead of data from one year before the lawsuit filing. Our results 
are little affected by this change. In a second test, we split our sample into two subgroups, i.e., 
a tech and non-tech subsample, to explore whether our results hold for both technology and 
non-technology firms. We again obtain similar results for both subgroups. Third, we re-run our 
PSM regression analysis and include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 17 industry 
classification along with size and book to market ratio as matching criteria to rule out the 
influence of industry effects. The resultant tests are again in line with our main models and are 
available upon request. 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether firms that exhibit shortcomings in their 
corporate governance face an increased risk of shareholder class action litigation. Specifically, 
we explore whether ex-post passive monitoring by the firm’s shareholders acts a substitute for 
insufficient ex-ante active monitoring by the firm’s board. To address this question, we 
estimate a series of logit models in which we regress the litigation propensity of a set of sued 
firms and a propensity-score matched sample of non-sued firms against various variables that 
characterize the firms’ corporate governance during the period from January 1996 and 2017.  
In addition, we explore the consequences of shareholder litigation for a given firm by 
examining how it affects the firm’s performance and its corporate governance. The latter 
analysis shines a light on the notion that ex-post passive monitoring forces firms and their 
boards to improve their active monitoring.  
We find evidence that the litigation risk of firms can be explained by variables that describe 
a firm’s corporate governance, the compensation of its CEO, as well as the CEO’s 
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characteristics. Board variables, including board size, board independence, the size of the 
nominating committee, nominating committee independence, and CEO/chairman duality, all 
serve as significant predictors of shareholder litigation. Our results are robust to controlling for 
a set of Fama-French industry dummies as additional matching criteria (along with the size and 
the book-to-market ratio) to rule out the influence of potential industry effects. In addition, 
they are insensitive to employing a two-stage Probit instrumental variable model to address 
potential endogeneity concerns in our main regressions. Also, for robustness, we include 
dummies based on the Fama-French 17 industry classification in each model to control for the 
effect of different industries on the likelihood of a lawsuit. 
In the aftermath of a lawsuit, our results show that sued firms improve certain aspects of 
their corporate governance such as the proportion of independent directors. We further 
document that the accounting performance of sued firms decreases two years after a lawsuit; 
however, firms that improve their governance experience an improvement in their accounting 
performance. To address potential reverse causality problems that may affect our primary 
independent variable (the governance index), we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variable regression to further understand the effect of a lawsuit on a firm’s 
performance, using changes in ROA as the dependent variable. The results of that regression 
show that shareholder class action litigation significantly and negatively affects the accounting 
performance of firms. Also, we observe negative coefficients for changes in the governance 
index, which suggest that firms that improve their governance index also improve their 
accounting performance. 
 The findings of this study have important corporate implications for corporate boards and 
regulators who are concerned about the high costs associated with shareholder litigation. 
Specifically, they show that firms that employ good corporate governance practices may reduce 
their risk of class action litigation and the associated direct and indirect burdens such litigation 
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Table 1: Sample Formation 
This table provides an overview of our sample formation procedure and outlines the number of firms we lose as 
a result of various filters we apply during our sample selection process and due to missing information in the 
databases we employ in this study. Our litigation sample covers the period from January 1996 to December 2017. 
 




Lawsuits listed on Stanford’s SCAA database 4,598 










































Table 2: Governance Index Breakdown 
This table provides an overview of the corporate governance provisions we employ in calculating our governance index. The governance index (G.I.) consists of 13 provisions with 
full data available in both the ISS Legacy and Governance databases. The G.I. ranges from -2 to 11, with a higher index representing poorer corporate governance quality. The G.I. 
can be as low as -2 because of two provisions (cumulative voting and confidential voting) that, when present, have a positive effect on the corporate governance quality of a firm, 
and thus a negative effect on the G.I. 
 
Variable Name  
(ISS Abbreviation) 
Description / Explanation 
Effect on Governance 
Index if Present 
Blank check for preferred stock 
(blankcheck) 
This provision gives the board of directors the ability to issue preferred stock without shareholder approval; this will dilute the 
common stock and make an acquisition less attractive or even impossible. 
+1 
Classified board/Staggered board 
(cboard) 
A classified board has different classes of directors with overlapping terms. With a classified board, only part of the board can be 
replaced each year, so an outsider has to wait for up to two years to gain full control of the board. 
+1 
Limits to the ability to call a special 
meeting (lspmt) 
In the case of a takeover attempt, this will add extra time to proxy fights because bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled 
annual meeting to replace board members or dismantle takeover defences. 
+1 
Limits to the ability to act by written 
consent (lwcnst) 
In the case of a takeover attempt, this will add extra time to proxy fights, because bidders must wait until the regularly scheduled 
annual meeting to replace board members or dismantle takeover defences. 
+1 
Cumulative voting (cumvote) A provision that allows shareholders to allocate the votes for the election of directors in any way they desire. The provision 
enables holders of minority stakes to elect one or more directors if they can assemble sufficient support. 
-1 
Confidential voting / secret ballots 
(confvote) 
A provision that does not allow the management to know how shareholders vote on their proxy cards, or to view ballots. -1 
Limits to the ability to amend the 
bylaws (labylw) 
This provision limits shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws of the corporation.  +1 
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Limits to the ability to amend the 
charter (lachtr) 
This provision limits shareholders’ ability to amend the charter of the corporation.  +1 
Unequal voting rights (uneqvote) This provision limits the voting power of shareholders who have exceeded a certain threshold of ownership. +1 
Fair price (fairprice) The fair price provision requires a bidder to pay all shareholders a “fair price”, usually defined as the highest price the bidder paid 
for any of the shares it acquires in a target company during a specified period before the commencement of a tender offer. 
+1 
Golden parachute (gparachute) A severance agreement/contract between a company and an executive that provides compensation to top managers for loss of job 
following a change of control. 
+1 
Poison pill (ppill) This provision gives the target stockholders the right to purchase the target’s or acquirer’s stock at a steep discount, diluting the 
bidder’s voting power, making the target financially unattractive or diluting the voting power of the potential acquirer.  
+1 
Supermajority required to approve a 
merger (supermajor) 
This provision requires the approval of the holders of two-thirds or more of the outstanding shares for a merger. +1 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for all variables used in this study, reported separately for sued and non-sued firms. Each non-sued firm is propensity-score-matched to 
a sued firm based on its size and book to market ratio. The number of observations for the sued and non-sued subsamples varies because of missing observations for some 
variables. In the last two columns, we report p-values for a t-test and Wilcoxon test to test for the significance of differences in the means and medians between the two 
subsamples, respectively. P-values that indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or better are bolded. Definitions for all variables are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
 
 Sued Sample Non-Sued Sample T-test Wilcoxon Test 
Variables Obs. Mean Median S.D. Obs. Mean Median S.D. p-Value p-Value 
Ratio of Certified Inside Directors 253 0.034 0 0.056 272 0.039 0 0.054 0.206 0.288 
G Index 259 5.170 5 2.271 282 4.968 5 2.221 0.005 0.046 
Board Size 266 9.282 9 2.585 271 9.474 9 2.706 0.029 0.039 
Ratio of Independent Directors 266 0.715 0.75 0.174 271 0.729 0.773 0.168 0.140 0.937 
Ratio of Directors Holding more than 1 Seat 266 0.561 0.444 0.507 271 0.515 0.4 0.475 0.003 0.009 
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders 266 0.038 0 0.087 271 0.043 0 0.088 0.111 0.058 
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy 266 0.115 0 0.111 271 0.105 0 0.105 0.004 0.003 
Ratio of Nominating Directors 266 0.313 0.333 0.201 271 0.325 0.333 0.213 0.097 0.078 
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members 266 0.285 0.307 0.198 271 0.299 0.333 0.210 0.053 0.060 
CEO Age (Years) 266 54.054 54.981 1.151 271 55.98 55.98 1.132 0.000 0.001 
CEO Tenure (Years) 266 5.370 5.995 2.372 271 5.595 5.995 2.425 0.161 0.151 
CEO Voting Power (%) 266 4.612 1.1 11.518 271 4.309 1.1 11.867 0.654 0.680 
CEO Stock Ownership 239 0.545 0.067 1.419 242 0.519 0.072 1.435 0.578 0.723 
Number of Institutional Block Owners 858 2.123 2 1.779 771 1.153 0 1.652 0.000 0.000 
Institutional Investor Ownership 858 0.474 0.477 0.297 771 0.270 0.124 0.436 0.000 0.000 
Number of Institutional Owners 858 159.92 93 211.611 771 60.902 12 125.205 0.000 0.000 
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CEO Bonus Compensation 332 0.122 0 0.182 379 0.095 0 0.163 0.000 0.000 
CEO Option Compensation 332 0.316 0.132 0.599 379 0.258 0.101 0.760 0.090 0.000 
CEO Salary Compensation 332 0.318 0.220 0.283 379 0.343 0.266 0.266 0.005 0.000 
CEO Long-Term Incentive Plan Compensation 332 0.028 0 0.099 379 0.034 0 0.105 0.258 0.285 
Price Volatility 655 0.039 0.036 0.019 565 0.035 0.029 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Stock Turnover 655 1.287 0.962 1.282 565 0.992 0.665 1.253 0.000 0.000 
Buy & Hold Return 655 0.060 -0.109 1.01 565 0.130 -0.018 1.801 0.149 0.231 
Intangible Assets 946 4.504 4.673 2.820 987 4.523 4.544 2.85 0.850 0.000 
R&D Expense Ratio 946 0.125 0.069 0.293 892 0.188 0.039 0.836 0.001 0.000 
ROA 1042 0.037 0.085 0.203 1040 0.040 0.074 0.186 0.420 0.585 
Leverage 1041 0.739 0.466 8.517 1045 0.704 0.520 4.594 0.863 0.625 
Dividend Payout Ratio 1042 0.048 0 1.259 1041 0.091 0 2.017 0.398 0.934 
Analyst Coverage 913 10.06 7 9.170 746 9.042 7 8.313 0.001 0.000 
Tech Dummy 1045 0.481 0 0.369 1045 0.163 0 0.499 0.000 0.000 
Number of Preceding Lawsuits 1045 127.30 122 36.951 1045 112.7 109 42.338 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Results: The Effects of Corporate Governance on a Firm’s Litigation Risk 
This table provides the results for a series of logistic regressions used to determine a firm’s litigation risk. The dependent variable in each specification is equal to 1 if the firm is sued and 0 
otherwise. Each column corresponds to one of our hypotheses in which we explore the determinants of a firm being sued. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-
value (in parentheses). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 














G Index 0.179***       
 (0.000)       
Board Size  0.056      
  (0.287)      
Ratio of Independent Directors  -1.440*      
  (0.093)      
Ratio of Directors Holding more than 1 Seat  -0.184      
  (0.461)      
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders  0.061      
  (0.971)      
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy  1.884 1.612     
  (0.301) (0.367)     
Ratio of Nominating Directors   3.402*     
   (0.053)     
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members   -4.066**     
   (0.024)     
Ln (CEO Age)    0.831    
    (0.372)    
Ln (CEO Tenure)    -0.145    
    (0.289)    
CEO Voting Power    0.032*    
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    (0.099)    
CEO Stock Ownership     0.031   
     (0.757)   
Number of Institutional Block Owners     -0.008   
     (0.903)   
Institutional Investor Ownership     -0.136   
     (0.823)   
Number of Institutional Owners     -0.0004   
     (0.396)   
CEO Bonus Compensation      2.291*  
      (0.089)  
CEO Option Compensation      0.022  
      (0.911)  
CEO Salary Compensation       -0.157 
       (0.792) 
CEO Long-Term Incentive Plan Compensation       0.338 
       (0.833) 
Price Volatility  6.514 12.00 11.97 24.72** 14.27 18.99 47.37*** 
 (0.521) (0.275) (0.271) (0.035) (0.110) (0.156) (0.007) 
Stock Turnover 0.414*** 0.981*** 0.987*** 0.938*** 0.587*** 0.605*** 0.744*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
Buy & Hold Return -0.544** -0.286 -0.291 -0.218 -0.090 -0.047 0.056 
 (0.011) (0.212) (0.203) (0.371) (0.502) (0.763) (0.845) 
Intangible Assets -0.0129 0.176** 0.166** 0.212** 0.076 0.146* 0.111 
 (0.879) (0.033) (0.042) (0.017) (0.291) (0.095) (0.384) 
R&D Expense Ratio 0.145 -1.216 -1.418 -1.809 0.568 -0.366 2.211 
 (0.934) (0.582) (0.517) (0.433) (0.719) (0.837) (0.526) 
ROA -2.353* -0.907 -0.824 -1.596 0.0532 -0.814 1.971 
 (0.070) (0.507) (0.543) (0.280) (0.965) (0.544) (0.337) 
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Leverage -0.793 -0.819 -0.933 -1.094* -0.905* -1.263** -0.694 
 (0.126) (0.158) (0.100) (0.077) (0.054) (0.032) (0.346) 
Dividend Payout Ratio -0.802 -0.704 -0.703 -0.647 -0.570 -0.357 -0.669 
 (0.116) (0.178) (0.169) (0.209) (0.173) (0.444) (0.399) 
Analyst Coverage 0.039*** 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.028 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.562) (0.557) (0.391) (0.207) (0.132) (0.639) 
Tech Dummy 0.142 0.290 0.286 0.151 0.152 0.011 -0.018 
 (0.547) (0.216) (0.220) (0.547) (0.472) (0.963) (0.960) 
Number of Preceding Lawsuits 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.009*** -0.002 
 (0.120) (0.240) (0.292) (0.118) (0.215) (0.001) (0.140) 
Constant -1.336 -0.632 -1.250 -4.795 -1.908* -2.286** -3.735*** 
 (0.122) (0.560) (0.149) (0.196) (0.052) (0.036) (0.006) 
Observations 512 541 541 474 598 414 239 




Table 5: IV Probit Regression Results 
This table provides the results for a series of instrumental variable (IV) Probit regressions. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an exogenous shock to the composition of many U.S. 
boards of directors, as it forced those boards to replace some of their internal directors with outside directors. Our instrumental variable is correlated with our endogenous variable but uncorrelated 
with each regression’s error term. The dependent variable in each model specification is equal to one if the firm is sued and zero otherwise. We refer to inside directors with outside directorships 
as externally certified inside directors (CIDs). For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 












Ratio of Certified Inside Directors -0.842 -17.783*** -11.677*** -8.058* -3.093 0.122 4.969 
 (0.887) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.619) (1.000) (0.538) 
G Index 0.007       
 (0.714)       
Board Size 
 
-0.005      
 
 
(0.595)      
Ratio of Independent Directors 
 
-0.335**      
 
 
(0.010)      









   
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders  -0.824***      
  (0.005)      
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy  0.147 0.735***     
  (0.323) (0.004)     
Ratio of Nominating Directors   0.282     
   (0.442)     
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members   -0.299     
   (0.427)     
Ln (CEO Age)   
 
0.514**    
   
 
(0.034)    
Ln (CEO Tenure)   
 
-0.033    
   
 
(0.405)    
CEO Voting Power    0.0002    
    (0.941)    
CEO Stock Ownership     -0.010   
     (0.589)   
Number of Institutional Block Owners     0.029   
     (0.305)   
Institutional Investor Ownership     -0.088   
     (0.719)   
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Number of Institutional Owners     -0.000   
     (0.718)   
CEO Bonus Compensation      0.675  
      (0.998)  
CEO Option Compensation      0.011  
      (0.999)  
CEO Salary Compensation       0.180 
       (0.372) 
CEO Long-Term Incentive Plan Compensation       -0.250 
       (0.597) 
Price Volatility 11.758*** 0.664 5.597** 9.240*** 10.537*** 20.660 12.819** 
 (0.000) (0.814) (0.049) (0.002) (0.000) (0.995) (0.015) 
Stock Turnover 0.058 0.092** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.074 0.136 0.118 
 (0.212) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.114) (0.996) (0.172) 
Buy & Hold Return -0.161** -0.047 -0.095* -0.075 -0.085 -0.032 -0.208* 
 (0.029) (0.225) (0.057) (0.199) (0.177) (0.998) (0.057) 
Intangible Assets 0.063** 0.070*** 0.086*** 0.103*** 0.068*** 0.133 0.015 
 (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.993) (0.700) 
R&D Expense Ratio -0.070 -0.199 -0.151 -0.516 -0.469 -0.305 -1.568 
 (0.922) (0.580) (0.779) (0.422) (0.535) (0.999) (0.150) 
ROA -0.201 -0.024 -0.012 -0.066 0.233 0.381 0.216 
 (0.613) (0.897) (0.966) (0.852) (0.561) (0.996) (0.708) 
Size 0.094** 0.004 0.092*** 0.059 0.104 -0.010 0.120 
 (0.039) (0.851) (0.002) (0.117) (0.224) (0.999) (0.214) 
Leverage -0.262 -0.028 -0.040 -0.115 -0.222 -0.490 -0.182 
 (0.230) (0.792) (0.798) (0.535) (0.260) (0.995) (0.570) 
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.989) (0.422) (0.738) (0.884) (0.958) (0.997) (0.981) 
Book to Market Ratio -0.246** -0.053 -0.175** -0.196** -0.204** -0.251 -0.123 
 (0.013) (0.491) (0.036) (0.045) (0.044) (0.997) (0.453) 
Analyst Coverage 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.006* 0.005 0.002 
 (0.142) (0.561) (0.260) (0.125) (0.086) (0.993) (0.754) 
Tech Dummy 0.220** 0.005 0.103 0.138 0.234** 0.161 0.403*** 
 (0.026) (0.946) (0.222) (0.142) (0.015) (0.998) (0.001) 
Number of Preceding Lawsuits 0.001 -0.000 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.151) (0.983) (0.019) (0.003) (0.094) (0.992) (0.433) 
Constant -3.408*** -0.673 -2.635*** -4.926*** -3.370*** -4.038 -3.477*** 
 (0.000) (0.392) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.959) (0.000) 
Observations 6,876 8,138 8,138 7,081 7,682 4,756 3,221 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald test of exogeneity (0.893) (0.011) (0.009) (0.107) (0.616) (1.000) (0.571) 
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Table 6: IV Probit Regression Results, With Industry Dummies 
This table provides the results for a series of instrumental variable (IV) Probit regressions, including dummies based on the Fama-French 17 industry classification in each model to control for 
the effect of different industries on the likelihood of a lawsuit. The dependent variable in each of model specification is equal to one if the firm is sued and zero otherwise. We refer to inside 
directors with outside directorship as externally certified inside directors (CIDs). For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 












Ratio of Certified Inside Directors -2.273 -17.927*** -12.287*** -9.307** -5.106 0.109 4.611 
 (0.706) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.426) (1.000) (0.529) 
G Index 0.011       
 (0.539)       
Board Size 
 
-0.006      
 
 
(0.505)      
Ratio of Independent Directors 
 
-0.283**      
 
 
(0.045)      









   
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders  -0.807***      
  (0.006)      
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy  0.129 0.742***     
  (0.373) (0.002)     
Ratio of Nominating Directors   0.180     
   (0.614)     
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members   -0.162     
   (0.655)     
Ln (CEO Age)   
 
0.514**    
   
 
(0.029)    
Ln (CEO Tenure)   
 
-0.023    
   
 
(0.544)    
CEO Voting Power    -0.002    
    (0.654)    
CEO Stock Ownership     -0.0005   
     (0.995)   
Number of Institutional Block Owners     0.031   
     (0.279)   
Institutional Investor Ownership     -0.063   
     (0.798)   
Number of Institutional Owners     -0.0004   
     (0.350)   
CEO Bonus Compensation      0.542  
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      (0.999)  
CEO Option Compensation      -0.010  
      (0.999)  
CEO Salary Compensation       0.169 
       (0.397) 
CEO Long-Term Incentive Plan Compensation       0.038 
       (0.938) 
Price Volatility 11.588*** 0.963 5.718** 9.326*** 10.905*** 23.177 13.160*** 
 (0.000) (0.727) (0.040) (0.002) (0.000) (0.994) (0.007) 
Stock Turnover 0.063 0.091** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.077* 0.143 0.129 
 (0.171) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.082) (0.996) (0.128) 
Buy & Hold Return -0.155** -0.042 -0.087* -0.066 -0.089 -0.028 -0.203* 
 (0.036) (0.261) (0.078) (0.250) (0.171) (0.998) (0.067) 
Intangible Assets 0.053* 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.063** 0.110 0.012 
 (0.082) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.994) (0.758) 
R&D Expense Ratio 0.300 -0.359 -0.102 -0.171 0.176 0.199 -0.597 
 (0.627) (0.229) (0.819) (0.754) (0.772) (0.998) (0.529) 
ROA -0.278 -0.005 -0.023 -0.119 0.168 0.253 0.089 
 (0.498) (0.980) (0.932) (0.730) (0.685) (0.994) (0.879) 
Size 0.112** 0.018 0.112*** 0.083** 0.158* 0.016 0.130 
 (0.024) (0.481) (0.000) (0.029) (0.078) (0.999) (0.181) 
Leverage -0.381 -0.074 -0.120 -0.208 -0.407** -0.681 -0.379 
 (0.103) (0.570) (0.484) (0.292) (0.046) (0.995) (0.229) 
Dividend Payout Ratio -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.354 
 (0.718) (0.351) (0.537) (0.696) (0.727) (0.997) (0.182) 
Book to Market Ratio -0.204** -0.030 -0.132 -0.153 -0.184* -0.250 -0.089 
 (0.046) (0.660) (0.102) (0.110) (0.075) (0.997) (0.555) 
Analyst Coverage 0.007* 0.002 0.005* 0.007* 0.008** 0.007 0.003 
 (0.072) (0.291) (0.089) (0.053) (0.045) (0.995) (0.626) 
Number of Preceding Lawsuits 0.001 -0.000 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.121) (0.898) (0.023) (0.004) (0.083) (0.992) (0.377) 
Constant 0.476 1.033 0.786 -1.590 -0.036 -4.024 -0.001 
 (0.999) (0.995) (0.999) (0.996) (1.000) (0.882) (1.000) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,291 8,010 8,010 6,971 7,453 4,692 2,931 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




Table 7: Univariate Analysis of the Aftermath of Lawsuits: Select Corporate Governance Variables 
This table compares a series of preselected corporate governance characteristics before and after the lawsuit filing. Panel A presents changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to one year after 
the lawsuit. Panel B presents changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to two years after the lawsuit. The last column in both panels presents the p-values for a series of t-tests in which we 
examine the statistical significance of differences in means between each subsample.  
Panel A: Year T-1 vs. Year T+1 
 Year T-1 Year T+1  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
T-Test 
p-value 
G Index 877 5.209 2.259 926 5.049 2.194 0.063 
Board Size 879 9.242 2.566 622 9.207 2.456 0.790 
Ratio of Independent Directors 870 0.708 0.173 622 0.717 0.164 0.314 
Ratio of Directors Holding more than 1 Seat 870 0.552 0.016 622 0.574 0.019 0.414 
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders 870 0.037 0.087 622 0.041 0.080 0.392 
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy 870 0.113 0.109 622 0.119 0.113 0.300 
Ratio of Nominating Directors 870 0.318 0.202 622 0.338 0.196 0.056 
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members 870 0.289 0.199 622 0.308 0.196 0.068 
          
Panel B: Year T-1 vs. Year T+2          
 Year T-1 Year T+2  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
T-Test 
p-value 
G Index 928 5.176 2.261 899 5.134 2.191 0.689 
Board Size 915 9.277 2.604 564 9.246 2.371 0.817 
Ratio of Independent Directors 915 0.707 0.173 564 0.740 0.149 0.000 
Ratio of Directors Holding more than 1 Seat 915 0.567 0.508 564 0.567 0.466 0.994 
Ratio of Non-Employee Block Holders 915 0.038 0.086 564 0.038 0.076 0.959 
CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy 915 0.117 0.111 564 0.114 0.117 0.605 
Ratio of Nominating Directors 915 0.315 0.203 564 0.352 0.191 0.000 
Ratio of Independent Nominating Committee Members 915 0.287 0.200 564 0.328 0.193 0.000 
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results: The Aftermath of Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
This table presents results for a series of multivariate OLS regressions to examine the effects securities class action lawsuits have on the corporate governance characteristics of a firm. Panel A 
considers changes from one year prior to the lawsuit to one after the lawsuit (i.e., from year t-1 to year t+1). Panel B considers changes from one year prior to two years after the lawsuit (i.e., 
from year t-1 to year t+2). The dependent variable in each model is labelled in the first row. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Changes from One Year Prior to the Lawsuit (t-1) to One Year after the Lawsuit (t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Δ G Index Δ Ratio of Certified 
Inside Directors 
Δ Ratio of Independent 
Directors 
Δ Ratio of Directors 
Holding more than 1 
Seat 
Δ Ratio of Independent 
Nominating 
Committee Members 





Sued -0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.014 -0.001 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.987) (0.772) (0.172) (0.579) (0.936) (0.378) (0.408) 
Δ ROA 0.156 0.005 -0.033 0.076 -0.014 0.019  
 (0.582) (0.760) (0.274) (0.354) (0.775) (0.382)  
Δ Price Volatility 14.65*** -0.148* -0.352*** -0.722* -1.025*** -0.505***  
 (0.000) (0.070) (0.009) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000)  
Δ Intangible Assets 0.033 0.002* 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.0001  
 (0.140) (0.0979) (0.442) (0.475) (0.139) (0.955)  
Δ Leverage 0.188 -0.009 -0.007 -0.024 0.021 -0.014  
 (0.125) (0.241) (0.593) (0.496) (0.327) (0.147)  
Δ Size 0.0632 0.002 -0.013** 0.039** 0.001 0.015***  
 (0.317) (0.498) (0.043) (0.026) (0.870) (0.001)  
Δ Book to Market Ratio 0.058 -0.005** 0.004 -0.013 0.010 -0.0004  
 (0.102) (0.015) (0.310) (0.234) (0.117) (0.875)  
Δ Board Size 0.027*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.0002 -0.015*** 0.00001  
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.177) (0.932) (0.000) (0.990)  
Δ Free Cash Flow  0.218 0.002 0.046** 0.044 0.119*** 0.023  
 (0.314) (0.869) (0.043) (0.479) (0.001) (0.179)  
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Δ Ln (CEO Age)       0.113*** 
       (0.000) 
Δ Ln (CEO Tenure)        0.013*** 
       (0.000) 
Constant 0.033** 0.002* -0.018*** 0.033*** -0.019*** -0.009*** 0.002*** 
 (0.038) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 3,354 3,981 3,988 3,988 3,988 3,988 18,293 
F-test (p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.027 0.014 0.041 
Continued on next page.  
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Panel B: Changes from One Year Prior to the Lawsuit (t-1) to Two Years after the Lawsuit (t+2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 2y Δ in G Index 2y Δ Ratio of 
Certified Inside 
Directors 
2y Δ Ratio of 
Independent Directors 
2y Δ Ratio of 
Directors Holding 
more than 1 Seat 










Sued -0.680*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.028 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.810) (0.507) (0.382) (0.604) (0.395) (0.191) 
Δ ROA 2 0.767* 0.010 -0.123*** -0.060 -0.176*** -0.007  
 (0.079) (0.607) (0.000) (0.525) (0.001) (0.772)  
Δ Price Volatility 2 48.25*** 0.010 0.035 -0.240 -1.578*** -1.620***  
 (0.000) (0.899) (0.800) (0.533) (0.000) (0.000)  
Δ Intangible Assets 2 0.029 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.005 -0.00006  
 (0.344) (0.227) (0.588) (0.360) (0.208) (0.973)  
Δ Leverage 2 -0.208 -0.008 -0.006 0.028 0.002 0.002  
 (0.202) (0.313) (0.650) (0.439) (0.899) (0.818)  
Δ Size 2 0.149* 0.003 -0.006 0.046*** 0.004 0.002  
 (0.073) (0.398) (0.326) (0.008) (0.700) (0.680)  
Δ Book to Market Ratio 2 0.286*** -0.002 0.012** 0.010 0.024*** -0.008**  
 (0.000) (0.421) (0.018) (0.436) (0.002) (0.016)  
Δ Board Size 2 0.050*** -0.001 0.0006 -0.010*** -0.012*** 0.001  
 (0.001) (0.148) (0.602) (0.002) (0.000) (0.235)  
Δ Free Cash Flow 2 0.269 -0.011 0.105*** 0.0004 0.166*** 0.019  
 (0.428) (0.484) (0.000) (0.996) (0.000) (0.311)  
Δ Ln (CEO Age) 2       0.108*** 
       (0.000) 
Δ Ln (CEO Tenure) 2       0.014*** 
       (0.000) 
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Constant -0.759*** 0.001 -0.035*** 0.040*** -0.032*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.263) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,798 3,259 3,266 3,266 3,266 3,266 16,186 
F-test (p-value) (0.405) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




Table 9: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) IV Regressions Results: Changes in ROA 
Following Lawsuits 
This table presents results for the second stage of two 2-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions in which we 
examine the effects of shareholder class action lawsuits on the profitability of firms. Our dependent variable is 
the change in the return on assets (ROA) from one year prior to the lawsuit to one year (two years) after the 
lawsuit, respectively. The change in ROA (ΔROA) is defined as ROAt+1 – ROAt-1 in column 1 and as ROAt+2 – 
ROAt-1 in column 2. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). 




One-Year ΔROA Two-Year ΔROA 
Ratio of Certified Inside Directors -1.056*** -1.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sued -0.024*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) 
Δ G Index -0.002  
 (0.291)  
Δ Price Volatility -0.113  
 (0.515)  
Δ Intangible Assets -0.001  
 (0.432)  
Δ Leverage -0.026**  
 (0.015)  
Δ Size 0.025***  
 (0.000)  
Δ Free cash flow 0.515***  
 (0)  
Δ G Index 2  -0.002* 
  (0.075) 
Δ Price Volatility 2  -0.318*** 
  (0.008) 
Δ Intangible Assets 2  0.0001 
  (0.934) 
Δ Size 2  0.009* 
  (0.081) 
Δ Leverage 2  -0.014 
  (0.162) 
Δ Free Cash Flow 2  0.537*** 
  (0.000) 
Constant -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3,872 3,322 
Wald test of exogeneity (0.000) (0.000) 
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Appendix: 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
This table defines the variables used in the study, along with their sources and descriptions. 
Variable Definition Source 
Corporate governance variables   
1. G Index, based on:  
• Blank check for preferred stock 
(blankcheck) 
• Classified board/Staggered board 
(cboard) 
• Limits to the ability to call a special 
meeting (lspmt) 
• Limits to the ability to act by 
written consent (lwcnst) 
• Cumulative voting (cumvote) 
• Confidential voting / secret ballots 
(confvote) 
• Limits to the ability to amend the 
bylaws (labylw) 
• Limits to the ability to amend the 
charter (lachtr) 
• Unequal voting rights (uneqvote) 
• Fair price (fairprice) 
• Golden parachute 
(goldenparachute) 
• Poison pill (ppill) 
• Supermajority required to approve 
a merger (supermajor) 
We calculate the G Index as the sum of 13 indicators 
of governance quality. Following Hazarika et al. 
(2012), we fill in the ISS Governance data for missing 
years by projecting them forward from the most 
recent ISS data. For example, the ISS Governance 
data from 1995 are used for 1996 and 1997 (which 
are missing in the database).  
 
We recode variables that have characters or numbers 
instead of a binary format and replace them with 
values in a dichotomous format. For example, if an 
observation for the variable supermajor is recorded 
with a value above 66.7%, we replace it with 1. 
 
For variables that have missing values, but for which 
the ISS database contains complementary variables 
that have the same meaning but are reported in a 
different format, we fill in the missing observations 
using the complementary variables.  For instance, if 
the variable labylw (limits to the ability to amend the 
bylaws) has missing values, then we examine the 
variable “Law-amend-votepcnt” and assign a value to 
0 to labylw if Law-amend-votepcnt is below 66.7%. 
ISS Governance 
database 
2. Board Size Number of directors on the board ISS Directors 
database 




4. Ratio of Directors Holding more 
than 1 Seat 
Number of directors sitting on other boards / Total 




5. Ratio of Non-Employee Block 
Holders 
Number of non-employee block holders (anyone 
holding more than 1% voting power) / Total directors 
on the board (see also Masulis and Mobs, 2011) 
ISS Directors 
database 
6. CEO/Chairman Duality Dummy Dummy variable indicating whether or not the CEO is 




7. Ratio of Nominating Directors The proportion of the members of the board of 
directors that is responsible for nominating candidates 
for board seats, defined as: Number of nominating 
committee members / Total directors on the board 
ISS Directors 
database 
8. Ratio of Independent Nominating 
Committee Members 
Number of independent directors who are also 
members of the nominating committee / Total 
directors on the board 
ISS Directors 
database 
9. Ln (CEO Age) Natural logarithm of the CEO’s age ISS Directors 
database 
10. Ln (CEO Tenure) Natural logarithm of (1 + the CEO’s tenure) ISS Directors 
database 
11. CEO Voting Power Percentage voting power held by the CEO at the end 
of the fiscal year (see also Masulis and Mobs, 2011) 
ISS Directors 
database 
12. Ratio of Certified Inside Directors Number of insiders with independent outside 
directorships / Total directors on the board (see also 
Masulis and Mobs, 2011) 
ISS Directors 
database 
13. CEO Stock Ownership Percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO 
at the end of the fiscal year 
Execucomp 
14. Number of Institutional Block 
Owners 
Number of institutional block owners (with 
ownership > 5%) at the end of the fiscal year 
13-F Thomson 
Reuters 
15. Institutional Investor Ownership Total institutional ownership, as a percentage of 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year 
13-FThomson 
Reuters 




17. CEO Bonus Compensation Dollar value of CEO bonuses during the fiscal year / 
Total CEO compensation during the same year 
Execucomp 
18. CEO Options Compensation Dollar value of CEO stock options during the fiscal 
year / Total CEO compensation during the same year 
Execucomp 
19. CEO Salary Compensation Dollar value of the CEO’s base salary during the 




20. CEO Long-Term Incentive Plan 
Compensation 
Dollar value of the CEO’s long-term incentive 
programs during the fiscal year / Total CEO 
compensation during the same year 
Execucomp 
Control variables   
21. Price Volatility  Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
during the fiscal year 
CRSP 
22. Stock Turnover Average daily trading volume during the fiscal year / 
Number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal 
year 
CRSP 
23. Buy & Hold Return One-year buy-and-hold return less the average annual 
return for the corresponding size and book-to market 
matched portfolio 
CRSP 
24. Intangible Assets Natural log of the firm’s intangible assets  COMPUSTAT 
25. R&D Expense Ratio R&D expenses / Total assets COMPUSTAT 
26. ROA Net income / Total assets COMPUSTAT 
27. Size Natural log of the firm’s total assets COMPUSTAT 
28. Leverage Total debt / Total assets COMPUSTAT 
29. Dividend Payout Ratio Total dividends paid / Earnings before interest and 
taxes 
COMPUSTAT 
30. Book to Market Ratio Book value of equity / Market value of equity COMPUSTAT 
31. Analyst Coverage Number of analysts covering the firm on a given date IBES 
32. Tech Dummy Dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm is 
classified as a technology firm based on its SIC code; 
we employ the classification by Kile and Phillips 
(2009) who consider firms with the following SIC 
codes as technology firms: 2833-2836, 3825- 3827, 
7370-7375, 7377-7379, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 
3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3829, 
3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899 
IBES 
33. Number of Preceding Lawsuits  Number of lawsuits during the 365-day period prior 
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The purpose of this study is to examine whether airlines with poor corporate governance 
characteristics exhibit poorer safety performance after controlling for a series of firm-level and 
country-level variables that characterize the airline and the country it is headquartered in. 
Specifically, we regress the number of accidents of each airline on various corporate governance 
variables along with six firm-level financial variables and seven country-level variables during the 
period 1990 to 2016. We find a negative relationship between an airline's corporate governance 
quality and its accident rate. Specifically, our results suggest that airlines with less qualified, older, 
and busier directors, as well as airlines with a higher risk of director succession, exhibit more 
frequent accidents. Moreover, the longer the CEO's tenure in an airline, the lower the number of 
accidents. The study also examines whether a country's macroeconomic and institutional 
environment affects the safety of airlines that are headquartered there. As expected, the results 
suggest that airlines based in countries with more stringent legal regulations, stronger law 
enforcement, and better air transport infrastructure have better safety performance.  
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1. Introduction 
You are sitting on a plane next to your significant other holding hands, enjoying the view 
above the clouds, and suddenly the plane runs into an area of severe turbulence. Ding! Buckle Up!! 
Your brain says: "Wait, what if the plane crashes." At one point or another, thoughts like these 
cross almost every air passenger's mind. Based on information provided by the Aviation Safety 
Network1, there have been over 12,000 fatalities from plane crashes in North America alone since 
1946. 
Although that figure places flying among the safest modes of transportation, a single accident 
can be catastrophic and frequently leads to substantial news coverage. Based on information 
provided by planecrashinfo.com, pilot errors and mechanical failures are arguably responsible for 
73% of all accidents, yet both are, to some extent, preventable because they are related to the way 
in which an airline company is directed and managed. For instance, the amount of money an airline 
spends on the renewal and maintenance of its air fleet, or how much it spends on training its pilots 
are discretionary expenses under the airline management's control. 
Prior studies have investigated various possible determinants of safety in the aviation 
industry. Snow (1975), Michel and Shaked (1984), and Rhoades and Waguespack (1999) examine 
the effectiveness of the industry's regulations in preventing accidents as well as the potential 
impact of regulations on the economic and financial performance of the airline industry. Relatedly, 
many studies examine the financial performance of airlines in the aftermath of a disaster or terrorist 
attack and demonstrate that such events often affect the whole industry (e.g., Walker et al., 2005). 
Another strand of the literature examines the relationship between competition in the 
industry and aviation safety. Abeyratne (2000) examines the consequences of strategic airline 
alliances on aviation safety and finds that although such alliances tend to foster growth and 
increase route coverage, they may reduce safety due to increased traffic volume; therefore, safety 
measures should grow in parallel to ensure the safe passage of the thousands of airplanes in the 
sky. Rhoades and Waguespack (1999) test the relationship between service and safety quality in 
the U.S. after industry deregulation that gave way to fierce competition. They note that service 
quality is a poor indicator of safety in their sample of air carriers. In a similar study, Jou et al. 
(2008) investigate the effect of service quality, price, and safety on passengers' choice behavior, 
 
1 See: https://aviation-safety.net 
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taking into consideration international airline competition. They find that safety, convenience, and 
service quality are major determinants of the booking decisions of air passengers.  
The airline industry is a sector that is highly prone not only to external shocks as evidenced, 
e.g., by the current COVID-19 crisis but is also heavily dependent upon the economic, institutional, 
and political environment of a given country (Morrell, 2011; Pagliari & Voltes-Dorta, 2012; 
Walker et al., 2014). Apart from such external factors, many internal factors may affect the 
probability of airline accidents. Examples of these include the number of hours of training that 
pilots receive, pilot performance, the privatization of airlines, and the age of air fleets (Sagers, 
1992; Gudmundsson, 2004; Walker et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2013; Ahmed and Ochieng, 2014; 
Asker and Kiraci, 2016). In addition, several previous papers (e.g., Rose, 1990; Li et al., 2004; 
Walker et al., 2020) examine the relationship between an airline's finances and its safety record. 
Their shared assumption is that financial constraints may cause air carriers to reduce maintenance 
and training expenses and to keep outdated airplanes in service. However, in practice, the situation 
appears to be more complex, as airline management may either sacrifice safety-enhancing 
investments in an effort to generate greater profits or may offset the high costs associated with 
safety investments by saving elsewhere. Therefore, empirical results on whether the financial 
status of an airline has any meaningful effect on its safety record are mixed. Furthermore, the 
findings in earlier studies are of limited value as they utilize shorter time-spans and only include 
cross-sectional data from one country such as the U.S. 
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978 has changed the aviation industry in the 
United States. It eliminates government control over many aspects of this industry. Other countries 
took similar steps to liberalize aviation industry services. Although they do not affect aviation 
safety rules directly, airline managers may take advantage of this freedom in the market and act 
on their interest, cutting down certain expenses such as pilot training, maintenance expenses, etc., 
hence posing a potential threat to an airline's safety. 
Deregulation increases the importance of managerial practices in a firm, including changes 
in operations, marketing, M&A activities and executive compensation (Cooper, 1999; Moritz, 
2001; Manuela, 2011). In addition, deregulations increase the costs of monitoring managerial 
performance and the intensity of potential agency problems. The extant literature suggests many 
changes in the governance mechanisms of airlines post-deregulation (cf., Kole and Lehn, 1996). 
Similarly, Lee et al. (2011) examine earnings management dynamics in the aviation industry 
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following the Airline Deregulation Act and find that earnings management significantly increased 
post-deregulation. Because industry deregulation generally increases managerial discretion, it is 
possible, if not expected, that airline managers take advantage of this freedom and sacrifice safety-
enhancing investments for their own benefit.  
We are only away of few studies that have investigated the relationship between an airline's 
governance structure and its safety performance. Moreover, the existing research in this area is 
often regionally or temporally limited or has other drawbacks. For example, Li and Yang (2014) 
examine the governance characteristics of airlines and their potential impact on airline safety 
performance, but their data is limited to Chinese airlines. Other researchers have studied the effect 
of an airline's governance practices on various other aspects of performance (other than its safety 
record). These studies have linked corporate governance to such factors as an airline's profitability, 
professional development, sustainability, and marketing efficiency (Mileski and Nwabueze, 2007; 
Goll et al., 2008; Lu et al., 2010; Rammal and Hermann, 2010; Callahan and Davis, 2012). 
Recently, Suhardjanto et al. (2017) examine the effect of ownership structure on airlines' financial 
performance using airlines in Asia and Australia and document a positive relation between foreign 
and government ownership and the financial performance of airlines. In a similar study, 
Vermooten (2018) tests options for the restructuring of state-owned airlines in South Africa and 
finds that the share issue privatization method of privatization is suited to resolve the capitalization 
of South African Airways (SAA) and subject SAA to market and regulatory disciplines. Most 
recently, Manda and Polisetty (2019) explore India's leading airline's boardroom battles that were 
triggered by alleged rights abuses by one of its co-founders. They find that although the airline 
(IndiGo) managed to stay profitable and keep its brand visibility, certain irregularities in IndiGo's 
corporate governance have raised shareholder concerns.  
One of the difficulties in obtaining consistent findings in this area is the rarity of airline accidents, 
together with the small sample size used in most studies. A comprehensive international sample 
is, therefore, needed to obtain more accurate results. In addition, a further limitation of earlier 
studies is that they were carried out before the industry was deregulated in most countries, as a 
result of which it became increasingly competitive. 
The primary contribution of this study is that it is the first to investigate the influence of an airline's 
corporate governance characteristics on its safety performance in a broad cross-country context, 
along with other variables that have already been shown to affect aviation safety, in particular, the 
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financial health of the airline. In addition, our study is the first to explore how the institutional and 
macroeconomic environment of a given country affect the safety performance of airlines 
headquartered there. As such, our study adds to the literature pertaining to the link between the 
management of airlines in diverse environments and their safety.  
The benefits of a comprehensive analysis of this nature are manifold. First, North American 
airlines are more heavily regulated and are subject to more stringent safety regulations than airlines 
in many other countries around the world. As such, even in light of poor financial performance 
and poor governance practices, they may not be able to significantly reduce their safety spending 
(and thereby heighten their accident susceptibility), making a relationship between accident rates, 
corporate governance characteristics and financial performance more difficult to identify. 
Moreover, given that accidents are rare, a large sample is required to separate accidents that occur 
due to pure bad luck from accidents that are truly the airline's fault. Finally, by employing a sample 
of airlines around the world, we are able to consider critical country-level factors (e.g., 
macroeconomic, regulatory, legal, and infrastructure-related variables) that cannot be examined in 
a single country context, but are of considerable interest when exploring the determinants of an 
airline's safety performance.   
Regarding the governance structure, we expect that board members holding multiple director 
positions in different airlines or a less diverse board of directors are less inclined to invest in new 
airplanes, pilot training, etc., resulting in a poorer safety record. Similarly, we expect that CEOs 
who also serve as chairmen of their companies' boards of directors are less monitored, and many 
thus shirk on important safety investments. We answer questions such as: What kind of directors 
should oversee the CEOs of airlines while they are making important decisions? What 
characteristics of directors strengthen their monitoring role on the board of an airline? What 
country characteristics help improve safety in the aviation industry? 
2. Data 
2.1  Sample description 
This study provides empirical evidence drawn from both North American and international 
sources. The sample consists of 372 airlines from 70 countries from 1990 to 2016. Due to the entry 
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and exit of several air carriers during that timeframe, as well as instances of missing data, the 
dataset is not fully balanced.2 
We retrieve our data from the following sources: 
1. The International Civil Aviation Organization offers several databases, including the three 
modules entitled Air Carrier Finances, Air Carrier Fleet, and Air Carrier Personnel, from which 
we retrieved data for all airlines. 
2. Data about governance characteristics of airlines are accessible through the BoardEx database, 
in particular, the "Organizational Summary" section. 
We manually reference and cross-check each airline from the ICAO database in BoardEx 
to ensure that we find exact matches and increase the matched sample size. In case we cannot find 
an exact match in the BoardEx database, we use the data of its parent airline instead of the airline 
subsidiary.3 We define our dependent variable as the number of accidents experienced by an airline 
in a particular year. Our independent variables consist of governance characteristics, financial 
measures, and a set of macro-level control variables. Similar to the previous literature, we estimate 
a series of Poisson regressions because ordinary least squares regressions used in combination with 
ratio data (e.g., accident ratios) as the dependent variable might lead to incorrect or misleading 
inferences (cf., Walker et al., 2020). 
We investigate airlines headquartered in different countries that are at various levels of 
development. These countries vary with respect to their economic strength, demographics, 
geography, infrastructure, and institutional environment. As such, our sample provides a 
comprehensive representation of the worldwide aviation industry.  
We obtain data on global aviation disasters from the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) and two online databases: aviation-safety.net and planecrashinfo.com. To ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of these databases, we compare the details of every overlapping record 
among the databases. In addition, we cross-reference the data to airline accident reports listed on 
Wikipedia. No inconsistencies or spurious data entries were found during these cross-checks.  
Based on the classification scheme provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), accidents differ from incidents in several aspects. Accidents include occurrences in which 
 
2 The authors are delighted to provide, on request, a list of the airlines included in the dataset together with their 
operating periods and all major accidents. 
3 Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we remove these airlines from our sample. 
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a person is fatally or seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure, or the 
aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.4 Accidents of this nature are frequently considered 
to be due to air carrier deficiencies such as pilot errors, inadequate training, or aircraft maintenance 
problems. In contrast, aviation incidents tend to be less severe and are frequently attributed to air 
traffic control failures or unusual natural events. We follow Rose (1989) who employs airline 
accidents as a proxy for safety, arguing that they are more appropriate than airline incidents to 
investigate air carrier safety as opposed to air system safety.   
2.2 Accident causes 
The website Planecrashinfo.com breaks down accident causes into five categories: (1) pilot 
error, (2) mechanical failure, (3) weather-related, (4) criminal activity, and (5) other. Because 
many accidents are attributed to more than one such cause, we focus our analysis on the primary 
cause listed in the accident description. 
*** Insert Table 1 About Here *** 
Table 1 provides information on the primary causes of fatal accidents that occurred in each 
decade since 1950. Accidents involving aircraft with 18 or fewer passengers aboard, military 
aircraft, private aircraft, and helicopters are excluded. Consistent with the findings in the literature 
(Wiegmann et al., 2001; Shappell et al., 2004) that identify pilot errors as the primary cause of 
aircraft accidents, the table shows that, on average, pilot errors account for 49 percent of all 
accidents. Pilot errors can be attributed to a range of organizational influences, including 
inadequate supervision, inappropriate planning of flights, inadequate training (Johnson and 
Holloway, 2004), willful violation of rules, and corruption to bypass regulatory oversight 
(Wiegmann et al., 2001). The second most prominent culprit is mechanical failures, which are 
responsible for 23 percent of all accidents. Prior academic studies (Sexton et al., 2000; Baker et 
al., 2001; Wiegmann et al., 2001) show that ground crews' lack of experience and aircraft 
manufacturer miscalculations are the main reasons for mechanical failures. The third and fourth 
most frequent causes of accidents include adverse weather and other causes, respectively, each 
accounting for approximately ten percent of all accidents. Weather-related accidents include poor 
visibility, severe turbulence, severe winds, icing, thunderstorms, lightning strike, etc. (Knecht and 
 
4 Specifically, ICAO defines an accident as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, 
and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft sustains damage or structual failure, 
or in which the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible” (see http://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx). 
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Lenz, 2010). However, Knecht and Lenz (2010) report that weather alone is rarely the sole culprit, 
and they point out that the lack of weather-related training and experience of pilots and poor-
quality equipment are contributing factors of aviation accidents in this category. Finally, the last 
category is criminal activities, accounting for approximately eight percent of all accidents. This 
category includes accidents caused by hijackings, shoot-downs, explosive devices aboard, and 
pilot suicides. Following Walker et al. (2020), we eliminate accidents in this latter category (i.e., 
criminal occurrence) as well as accidents caused by wildlife hits from our subsequent analysis, as 
those accidents do not reflect poor safety practices by the airline. 
3. Methodology 
We estimate the Poisson regression models as follows: 
Log(N(Accidents)) = β0 + β1 (Corporate Governance Characteristics) + β2 (Financial 
Variables) + β3 (Institutional & Macroeconomic Variables) + ε 
The main focus is on the corporate governance characteristics of airlines in the Poisson 
regression. We also include financial variables in our model to control for the financial health of 
airlines. The dependent variable is the number of accidents in the Poisson regression as a proxy 
for safety performance. Table 2 provides detailed definitions for all variables used in our study. 
*** Insert Table 2 About Here *** 
Our first group of variables is related to the corporate governance characteristics of airlines. 
The variables pertain to two categories: (1) board characteristics, and (2) CEO characteristics. In 
terms of board characteristics, we utilize various variables from BoardEx in our regression 
analysis, including the succession factor, the gender ratio, the board size, an independent director 
ratio, a "busy board" measure, the standard deviation of the busy board, the average number of 
professional qualifications held by the board members, the standard deviation of the age of 
directors, a ratio that captures the nationality mix among the board members, and the average 
directors' time to retire. The succession factor measures the clustering of directors around their 
retirement age, with a lower number presenting a higher risk of succession. We argue that airlines 
with a higher risk of succession will have a higher number of less-engaged board members and 
thus face a higher risk of accidents. Horner (2016) examines the clustering effect and finds that 
clustered boards with a large proportion of ready-to-retire directors shirk on their monitoring 
responsibilities.  
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The average number of professional qualifications held by board members is a proxy for 
how qualified directors are to make decisions for the company. We expect that boards with more 
qualified directors will better direct their CEOs to steer the airlines toward success, including safer 
operations. By using machine learning algorithms, Erel et al. (2018) find that male directors who 
hold more directorships and have fewer qualifications tend to be less desirable and provide poorer 
internal oversight. Similarly, Fich and Shivdastani (2006) report that firms with busy boards are 
associated with weak corporate governance. Our busy board variable captures the number of other 
directorships held by each director of the firm. We expect that directors with directorships at other 
firms will have less time to allocate to each firm they serve on, and that they provide poorer 
monitoring. As a result, airlines with busier boards of directors will have a larger number of 
accidents. The variables measuring the standard deviation of the age of directors and the average 
directors' time to retire capture the age diversity within a business environment. Similarly, the 
nationality mix and the gender ratio capture the cultural and gender diversity within a firm. 
Diversity among the board members is frequently viewed as having a positive influence on the 
monitoring quality of a board. For instance, Louch (2000) measures the age-related distance 
between directors on the board and shows that a higher age difference reduces the probability of 
established connections among individuals. In another study, Chidambaran et al. (2018) find that 
age, ethnicity, and gender diversity explain both director turnover and director promotions to more 
influential positions on boards. We anticipate that airlines with younger directors and a wider age 
range among the directors have a lower number of accidents because the directors have fewer 
established connections and can settle conflicts more objectively and efficiently. In addition, we 
expect that airlines with a more diverse board of directors benefit from improved internal 
monitoring and thus have fewer accidents. 
To capture the impact of CEO characteristics on a carrier's safety performance, we include 
CEO tenure, CEO age, and a CEO duality dummy in our analysis. Fich and Shivdastani (2007) 
explain the impact of CEO duality in a litigation context and report that fraudulent firms are more 
likely to exhibit CEO duality. In another study, Miller and Shamsie (2001) report that CEO tenure 
exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with firm performance: their experience grows which, 
in general, has a positive influence on firm performance, but their willingness to take on risks 
declines when they approach retirement. Similalrly, Baker and Mueller (2002) examine how CEO 
characteristics affect R&D spending and report that CEOs with longer tenure tend to act more in 
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their own interest, which results in weaker corporate governance practices and poorer 
performance.  
We use an essential control variable throughout all models: the average utilization factor, 
which captures the airline's accident risk in terms of total hours flown over total days available. In 
addition, we use four categories of financial ratios that are frequently used in the literature to 
evaluate a firm's performance and financial health: (1) the current ratio, a liquidity proxy, (2) total 
asset turnover, an activity ratio, and (3) the growth ratio, recognizing that sustainable growth is 
an important lever of business success. The fourth category includes two profitability ratios, which 
aim to capture an airline's current and expected future profitability and financial health: the net 
profit margin, and the Z Score.5  
The Altman Z Score model has been successfully used to predict firm failures in various industries 
as early as the 1980s. More recently, scholars employed this variable to predict the bankruptcy of 
carries in the aviation industry (Gritta et al. 2011; Stepanyan, 2014). 
We define two additional control variables, namely (1) the maintenance ratio to control for 
the effect of direct maintenance expenditures on safety, and (2) the operating revenue to control 
for the effect of airline size on safety. The maintenance ratio is defined as an airline's expenditures 
on flight equipment maintenance and overhaul divided by its total revenue. We use this variable 
to control for the overall attempt of an airline to update and maintain its air fleet, thereby keeping 
it secure and safe. The operating revenue is defined as an airline’s annual operating revenue 
reported in billions of dollars. We employ this variable in all models to capture the natural tendency 
for larger airlines to have more accidents. 
The airlines in this study are headquartered across various countries around the globe and it 
is reasonable to assume that the level of development and infrastructure of a given country affect 
the safety performance of airlines headquartered there. In an attempt to control for such country-
level determinants of airline safety, we consider a series of variables that proxy for the level of 
 
5 We calculate the Z Score using the formula for US and foreign firms because we study the global aviation industry. 
Specifically, we follow Altman et al. (2014) and consider Z Scores below 1.1 as representative of a firm’s distress zone, and 
above 2.6 as indicative of its safe zone (after discounting 3.25 from the score). The Z Score itself is calculated as: 
Z = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 + 3.25, where 
X1 = Working capital / Total assets, where X1 measures liquid assets in relation to the size of the company. 
X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets, where X2 measures profitability that reflects the company's age and earning power. 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets, where X3 measures operating efficiency apart from tax and leveraging 
factors. It recognizes operating earnings as being important to long-term viability. 
X4 = Book value of equity / Book value of total liabilities. This variable adds a market dimension that highlights security price 
fluctuations as a possible red flag. 
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corruption, the quality of law enforcement, the legal environment, and the quality of air transport 
infrastructure in a given country, as well as the state of a country's economy. Our research is one 
of the first study in which we control for macro variables in the finance/aviation literature. We 
argue that the accident propensity of airlines is higher in countries with a higher level of corruption, 
poorer law enforcement, and a less developed legal environment, due to a lack of consistent 
regulatory policies and the laxer enforcement of those policies. In addition, we expect airlines in 
countries whose economies are in poor health, whose technical infrastructure is antiquated, and/or 
whose aviation sector is underdeveloped to incur a higher accident risk. 
The country-level variables used in the study are: (1) registered carrier departures 
(Departures), which capture the number of domestic and international takeoffs of air carriers 
registered in the country and reflect air transportation usage in the country. We argue that the 
higher the flight volume in a given country, the higher the number of accidents, and (2) a country's 
unemployment rate, which is widely recognized as a key indicator of a country's economic well-
being. Moreover, following La Porta et al. (1998), we employ proxies for the quality of law and 
order in each country and consider (3) the efficiency of the judicial system, (4) the rule of law, and 
(5) the level of corruption. These measures are compiled by private credit risk agencies to assess 
differences in the institutional environment across countries. These three institutional environment 
measures are scored from zero to ten, with lower scores representing a lower quality institutional 
environment. Moreover, we employ an additional macro-level control variable, i.e., (6) the quality 
of air transport infrastructure. The quality of a country's air transport infrastructure is defined as 
the quality (extensiveness and condition) of air transport in a given country in a given year. The 
quality of air transport infrastructure information is retrieved from the Global Competitiveness 
Index Dataset provided by the World Economic Forum. The variable originally ranges from one 
to seven. We adjust the scale from (underdeveloped) to ten (most developed) to increase the 
variable’s comparability with the institutional variables mentioned above. Finally, we employ (7) 
an English legal origin dummy to identify whether the legal system of a given country originates 
from English common law. The variable equals one if the origin is English common law and zero 
otherwise. There is a vast literature which shows that common law countries have more effective 
institutions and policies than countries with legal systems that originate from civil law. For 
example, common law countries grant more freedom to the entry of new businesses (Djankov et 
al., 2002) and provide a better quality of contract enforcement and more reliable protection of 
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private property (Djankov et al., 2003). They are also associated with more highly developed 
financial systems (La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2008) and less corruption (Treisman, 2000). 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
We commence our empirical analysis with a series of univariate tests (see Table 3) in which 
we split our sample into two subsamples, a sample of airlines (firm-year observations) with 
accidents and one without accidents. For each subsample, we then report the mean and median for 
each variable. In the last two columns, we test for the equality of means and medians between the 
two subsamples and report the p-values for both a t-test for the difference in means and a Wilcoxon 
median test. 
*** Insert Table 3 About Here *** 
We see that the mean and median of the busy board variable are significantly higher for the 
sample with accidents than the sample without accidents, showing that airlines that have accidents 
also have busier boards of directors. As expected, the succession factor exhibits higher mean and 
median values for the sample without accidents than the sample with accidents implying that 
airlines that have accidents also have a higher risk of succession. Another interesting observation 
is that the mean and median board size is significantly higher for the sample with accidents than 
the sample without accidents, suggesting that airlines that have accidents also have larger boards 
of directors. This finding is in line with the literature that suggests that boards that are too large 
are less efficient and provide lower-quality monitoring. Moreover, we observe that airlines with 
accidents have older CEOs than airlines without accidents. Contrary to our expectations, the 
independent director ratio exhibits higher mean and median values for the sample with accidents 
than the sample without accidents. This may be due to potential endogeneity (which we will 
address in our multivariate setup) or may be due to the fact that airlines with accidents have larger 
boards than airlines without accidents, which may also affect their composition. From a financial 
perspective, airlines in the sample without accidents have a higher current ratio, greater asset 
turnover, and larger Z Scores compared to airlines in the sample with accidents, with all differences 
being statistically significant.  
In Panel C, we divide our sample into a series of subsamples, with each pair of subsamples 
formed around the median of our continuous or categorical independent variables (the below-
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median vs. above-median). For binary variables, we define the subsamples based directly on the 
underlying variable values (zero or one subsamples). For each subsample, we report the number 
of observations (N), as well as the mean and median of the number of accidents. We employ a 
series of t-tests and Wilcoxon tests to test for the equality of mean and median accidents between 
the subsample pairs.  
Our univariate tests provide initial support for our main hypotheses, suggesting that both an 
airline’s corporate governance as well as its home country’s institutional environment affect its 
safety performance. The mean and median accidents for airlines with a low (below-median) 
succession factor are higher than the accident rates for the above-median subsample. The 
differences are statistically significant, indicating (as expected) that airlines with a higher risk of 
succession have more accidents than airlines with a lower risk of succession. Similarly, the mean 
and median accidents are significantly higher for airlines with undiversified boards (boards with a 
smaller gender ratio), airlines with larger boards (board size >11 members), boards whose 
directors are about to retire sooner (average director time to retire ≤ 10.5 years), and airlines with 
older CEOs (CEO age > 60 years). Airlines with busier boards (busy board >2) and airlines with 
CEOs who also serve as chairmen of the board of directors (CEO duality = 1) also exhibit higher 
number of accidents. The subsample differences for the latter two variables are only significant in 
the median (not the mean), however. Somewhat surprisingly, the subsample differences suggest 
that boards with a higher proportion of independent directors (independent director ratio > 0.863) 
have higher accident rates. The difference becomes insignificant in our multivariate analysis, 
however. 
The subsample differences for other firm-level variables are also as expected: airlines with 
higher utilization factors (average airline utilization factor > 7.1), less liquid assets (current ratio 
≤ 0.905), lower asset turnover (total asset turnover ≤ 1.139), and lower Z scores (Z score ≤ 3.683) 
are more prone to accidents. The maintenance ratio also exhibits the expected differences, airlines 
with a lower maintenance ratio (maintenance ratio ≤ 0.106) have poorer safety performance, but 
the subsamples only differ in the mean, not the median.  
Finally, on a country level, airlines appear to have poorer safety performance if they are 
headquartered in countries with a higher flight volume (ln(departures) > 12.335). Contrary to our 
expectations, airlines from countries with a lower quality institutional environment and poorer 
enforcement of the law have fewer accidents. This contradiction may be due to the fact that we do 
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not control for the number of departures in each country in our univariate analysis. In our 
multivariate analysis, these variables reverse their signs and support our initial expectations. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 Before we estimate our regressions, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between each variable pair. The correlations are reported in Table 4. We mark in bold the 
correlation coefficients that exceed a threshold of 0.5 in absolute terms. In our subsequent analysis, 
we include these variables separately in our regressions to mitigate any multicollinearity concerns.6 
*** Insert Table 4 About Here *** 
4.3 Poisson Regression Analysis 
We first focus on the interpretation of variables related to an airline's corporate governance 
characteristics and their financial condition. In Models 1 to 5 of Table 5 (Panel A), we employ 
various combinations of our corporate governance variables while controlling for country-level 
influences. Model 1 provides the results for several board characteristic variables including the 
average number of qualifications of directors on the board, the succession factor, the gender ratio, 
and the board size. The coefficient of the average number of qualifications is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level indicating that airlines in which directors are more qualified 
have fewer accidents; increasing the average number of qualifications of directors by one unit 
causes a decrease in the log of the number of accidents by 1.12 units. The succession factor exhibits 
a negative (albeit insignificant) coefficient, suggesting that airlines with a lower risk of succession 
also have fewer accidents.7 The board size variable exhibits a negative coefficient that is 
insignificant, however.  
In all models, we include the average airline utilization factor which captures the airline's 
accident risk in terms of total hours flown over total days available. The variable exhibits a positive 
coefficient (that is only marginally significant in one model, however), providing a weak indication 
that airlines that employ their air fleet to a fuller extent (with possibly less time for maintenance 
between flights) are more prone to accidents.  
 
6 Due to the high correlation between the efficiency of the judicial system, corruption, the rule of law, and the quality 
of air transport infrastructure, reported in Table 4, we only include the rule of law (together with other country-
level controls) in all models in Panel A. In un-tabulated tests, we re-run the tests using the other variables (the 
efficiency of the judicial system, corruption, and the quality of air transport infrastructure) and we find similar 
results. We explore the individual effects of each country level variable in Panel B. 
7 Note that the succession factor becomes significant in two subsequent model specifications in Table 5. 
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*** Insert Table 5 About Here *** 
In Models 2 and 3, we keep the average number of qualifications and the succession factor 
and add the nationality mix (Model 2) and the standard deviation of the age of directors and the 
independent director ratio (Model 3), while dropping board size and the gender ratio, respectively. 
Both the succession factor and the average number of qualifications retain their signs from Model 
1, with the average number of qualifications remaining statistically significant in these models. 
The coefficient of the nationality mix is negative but insignificant, providing at best weak support 
for the notion that that airlines with more diverse boards also have fewer accidents. Similarly, the 
standard deviation of the age of directors exhibits a positive (albeit insignificant) coefficient. The 
variable remains positive with mixed significance levels in subsequent tables (Tables 6 to 8), 
offering weak support for our expectation that airlines with directors from a wider age range also 
have more accidents. This is probably due to the fact that directors from the same age group behave 
more homogeneously, and have fewer conflicts compared to boards with directors who are more 
diverse in terms of their age.  
In Model 4, we replace the corporate governance variables in Model 3 (other than the 
average number of qualifications) with the variables busy board, the standard deviation of the 
busy board, and the average directors' time to retire. The busy board variable exhibits a 
statistically significant positive coefficient, indicating that airlines with busier directors on the 
board have more accidents. This is as expected as busy directors are less likely to fulfill their 
monitoring role in an airline, which could lead to the CEO exploiting the airline's resources or 
shirking on his/her efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood of an accident. Also, the standard 
deviation of the busy board exhibits a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant, 
suggesting that the higher the standard deviation of the busy board variable, the lower the number 
of accidents. Intuitively, when there are less busy directors on a board (which increases the 
standard deviation of the busy board variable), it may cancel the adverse effects of busy directors 
on the number of accidents. Moreover, the average directors' time to retire also shows a negative, 
but insignificant coefficient. The coefficient remains negative and becomes borderline significant 
in subsequent tables, providing weak support for the notion that an airline with a younger board of 
directors will have fewer accidents. This provides partial evidence for our expectation that 
directors who are at earlier stages of their career and further from retirement are better monitors 
and are less likely to take on additional risk at the expense of the shareholders.  
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In Model 5, we test the effects of CEO characteristics, including CEO tenure, CEO age, 
and CEO duality on an airline’s safety performance. Our results show that CEO tenure has a 
negative coefficient. Again, the variable is insignificant here, but gains significance in some of our 
later tables, indicating that the longer the CEO's tenure in an airline, the lower the number of 
accidents. A common-sense interpretation for this finding is that, although the CEO’s tenure may 
influence his/her risk-taking behavior and consequently the firm's performance adversely, the 
CEO's insights that come with experience may cancel the negative effects of a seasoned CEO’s 
risk-adversity. Finally, as expected, CEO duality exhibits a positive coefficient, which is not 
statistically significant, however.  
In Models 6 and 7, we exclusively focus our attention on financial variables to examine 
whether our results confirm or contradict previous findings in the literature (see, e.g., Walker et 
al., 2020). The results for Model 6 indicate that the current ratio and total asset turnover have 
negative coefficients (although only the total asset turnover is statistically significant), suggesting 
that more liquid and particularly more efficient airlines have fewer accidents, as would be 
expected. Similarly, in Model 7, the Z Score exhibits a statistically significant negative coefficient, 
indicating that airlines with lower bankruptcy risk experience fewer accidents. Moreover, 
following our expectations, the coefficient of the maintenance ratio is negative, suggesting that 
when airlines increase their maintenance and overhaul expenses, they have fewer accidents. 
Similarly, the net profit margin exhibits statically significant negative coefficients in Models 2 to 
5, confirming our expectation that more profitable airlines have a lower accident risk. In all models, 
we control for an airline’s size by including the operating revenue of each airline. As would be 
expected, the variable consistently exhibits positive and statistically significant coefficients, 
suggesting that larger airlines experience more frequent accidents. In the last column, we include 
all variables used in the previous columns to examine whether or not our findings still hold in a 
fully specified model. Other than the net profit margin, all variables retain their signs and 
significance levels. In addition, the coefficient of the standard deviation of the age of directors 
becomes statistically significant at the 5% level, confirming our hypothesis that directors from the 
same age group behave more homogeneously and have fewer conflicts compared to boards with 
directors who are more diverse in terms of their age.  
The institutional and macroeconomic variables exhibit consistent signs and significance 
levels throughout most models. Somewhat surprisingly, the unemployment rate is significantly 
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negatively related to accident frequency, suggesting that airlines in countries with higher 
unemployment experience fewer accidents. The rule of law variable also exhibits a negative 
coefficient in all models showing, as expected, that airlines from countries with stronger tradition 
of law and order have fewer accidents.  
To address the potential multicollinearity between several of our (highly correlated) country-
level variables, we excluded three of them in Panel A. In Panel B, we exclusively focus on our 
institutional and macroeconomic variables and explore how each of them affects aviation safety 
when viewed alone. We employ the country-wide departures variable in all models to control for 
the size of the overall aviation sector in a given country. In Model 9, we find the coefficient of the 
unemployment rate to be positively, albeit insignificantly, associated with the number of accidents. 
We initially expected airlines in countries with higher unemployment rates (and weaker 
economies) to have poorer safety performance but, as noted earlier, found contrary results in Panel 
A and now inconclusive results in Panel B. In Model 10, we explore the effect of country-wide 
departures (as a proxy for the size of the country’s aviation sector). Our results show a significant 
positive coefficient for Ln (Departures), suggesting that airlines in countries with a large volume 
of flights experience more accidents – as would be expected. Next, we estimate four models 
designed to examine the effect of our institutional environment and law enforcement variables. 
The results are provided in Models 11 to 14 of Panel B. As mentioned above (see Section 3), other 
than the common law dummy, these measures (the efficiency of the judicial system, corruption, and 
the rule of law) are scored from zero to ten, with lower scores representing a lower quality 
institutional environment and/or poorer enforcement of the law. Except for the common law 
dummy, all variables exhibit significant negative coefficients. This confirms our hypothesis that 
airlines in countries with less efficient judicial systems, poorer law enforcement, and higher levels 
of corruption are likely to have poorer safety performance.  
In Model 15, we examine how the quality of a country’s air transport infrastructure affects 
the accident risk of airlines operating in that country. As expected, we observe a significant 
negative coefficient for the variable, suggesting that airlines in countries with better aviation 
infrastructures are less likely to have accidents. 
Finally, in the last column, we estimate a fully specified model in which we include all 
country-level variables. The joint inclusion of the variables reduces the significance of some. Each 
variable retains its expected sign, however. 
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5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 Reverse Causality 
One concern is that our results may be subject to reverse causality, i.e., that accidents cause 
declines in an airline's profitability and possibly a different board structure, and not vice versa. To 
address this possibility, we follow Rose (1990), Marcus et al. (1990), Dionne et al. (1997), and 
Wang et al. (2013), and re-run our Poisson regression using lagged independent variables. By 
employing lagged financial and board characteristics variables, we eliminate the possibility that 
accidents drive a firm's financial performance and governance characteristics and may thereby bias 
our results. Table 6 summarizes the results. Overall, in both Panels A and B, the results remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our original findings in Table 5. 
*** Insert Table 6 About Here *** 
Interestingly, once we employ lagged variables, the coefficients of board size, the standard 
deviation of the age of directors, and nationality mix become statistically significant compared to 
our findings in Table 5. The lagged standard deviation of the age of directors variable has a 
significant positive coefficient indicating that an increase in the standard deviation of the age of 
directors by one unit causes an increase in the log number of accidents by 0.229 units. Moreover, 
the lagged board size variable exhibits a significant positive coefficient in our full model 
specification suggesting that airlines have more accidents when they have more directors on their 
board – possibly because boards that become too large are less efficient and provide poorer 
monitoring than smaller boards.8 
5.2 Zero Inflated Regression 
Because our dependent variable has an excess of zero counts (aviation accidents are – 
fortunately – rare), we perform a robustness test in which we employ the zero-inflated regression 
variant of the Poisson model. The zero-inflated Poisson model allows for over-dispersion in the 
data. The results of our zero-inflated Poisson regressions are summarized in Table 7. In both Panel 
A and Panel B, the coefficients of our variables retain the same signs and significance levels as 
our results in Table 5, thus confirming our earlier findings.  
*** Insert Table 7 About Here *** 
 
8 Note that the literature examining the optimal board size suggests that boards should neither be too large nor too 
small with boards consisting of approximately six members often considered to be ideal. 
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5.3 Potentially Omitted Variables 
In a third set of robustness tests, we address the concern that potentially omitted variables may 
bias our result. This problem is common in studies of this kind. Following the literature in the area 
(O'Connell, 2007; Wooldridge, 2010; Amir et al., 2016), we perform a robustness test in which we 
control for random effects in our multivariate empirical analysis. Before doing so, we ran a 
Hausman specification test to choose the appropriate model (a random-effects model rather than a 
fixed-effects model). In addition, we evaluated the log-transformed over-dispersion parameter 
(lnalpha). This statistic assesses the extent to which the use of random effects enhances the fit of 
our model (compared to just using a pooled Poisson estimation). It confirmed that the random-
effects model is the appropriate option to control for firm-fixed effects in our empirical analysis 
and to address the potential omitted variable problem. The results, reported in Table 8, again 
remain qualitatively consistent with those reported in Table 5. 
*** Insert Table 8 About Here *** 
5.4 Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
One of the disadvantages of the Poisson regression model is that the failure rate (the accident 
rate in our study) is assumed to be constant throughout the period of investigation. Given the 
technological progress during our sample period, it is likely that this assumption is violated. The 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model relaxes this assumption and leaves the failure rate unspecified. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Poisson regression model, it does not make any assumptions regarding 
the shape and distribution of the dependent variable. Therefore, estimates are likely to be more 
robust under the Cox model. Many scholars have used the Cox Proportional Hazards Model in 
their analysis (Allen and Rose, 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2018). We follow prior studies 
that conduct survival analyses and perform a robustness test using the Cox model (see Table 9).9 
For consistency with our previous tables and to aid the interpretation of our results, we report 
positive-negative coefficients instead of hazard ratios. Most of the results reported in Table 9 
remain consistent with our original findings in Table 5. 
*** Insert Table 9 About Here *** 
 
9 We do not estimate the full model in Panel A of Table 9 to avoid over-specification that may result from the 
reduced sample size in our Table 9 regressions.  
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether airlines with poor corporate governance 
characteristics exhibit poorer safety performance after controlling for each airline's financial 
condition and a series of country-level variables. To address this question, we regress the number 
of accidents of our sample airlines on various firm-level corporate governance variables along with 
eight firm-level and seven country-level control variables during the period from 1990 to 2016. 
Overall, we find a negative relationship between an airline's corporate governance quality and its 
accident propensity. We find that the more qualified the directors on the board of an airline, the 
fewer accidents the airline will have. In addition, we find that airlines with a lower level of age-
clustering among the directors have fewer accidents. Although gender and national diversity 
among the board members exhibit negative signs, they are not significant. We further find that 
airlines with busier directors on the board have more accidents. Arguably, busy directors are less 
likely to fulfill their monitoring responsibilities in an airline, which can lead to the CEO exploiting 
the airline's resources or reducing his/her efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood of an accident. 
Although the coefficients of busy board variable are not statistically significant in all models, it is 
the case for most models and in the summary statistics section, and moreover the coefficients may 
lose their significance level because of the methodology used. Furthermore, our findings show that 
an airline with a younger board of directors tends to have fewer accidents. Finally, the longer the 
CEO's tenure in an airline, the lower the number of accidents. Although CEO duality exhibits a 
positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant.   
In a series of robustness tests, we employ Zero Inflated Poisson regressions instead of regular 
Poisson regressions to assess whether the excess of zeros in our dependent variable generates any 
incorrect inferences. We also add the utilization factor variable to all of our models to control for 
an airline's exposure to the risk of an accident. In almost all models, the results from the robustness 
tests are consistent with the main regressions. In another robustness test, we re-run our main 
Poisson regression models with lagged variables to address any potential reverse causality 
problems. Also, in an attempt to address any biases caused by potentially omitted variables, we 
perform a robustness test in which we control for random effects in our multivariate empirical 
analysis. Finally, we employ the Cox Proportional Hazards Model in another robustness test to 
find whether or not our results are consistent regardless of the specification of our regression 
models. 
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This study further examines whether a country's macroeconomic and institutional 
environment, as well as its infrastructure, affect the safety of airlines which are headquartered in 
that country. As expected, the results suggest that airlines based in countries with stronger law 
enforcement, more stringent legal regulations, and better air transport infrastructure have better 
safety performance. Although, the coefficient of the quality of air-transport infrastructure variable 
changes its sign in the last models, it may be due to multicollinearity in the last equation. 
The results of this study have important policy implications for both the airline industry and 
regulators. To allocate resources more efficiently, regulators may find it beneficial to focus their 
supervision on airlines with poor governance practices. Moreover, as noted earlier, pilot errors 
remain the most frequent cause of aviation accidents. Thus, developing and refining policies that 
reduce accidents caused by pilot errors should be a prime goal for regulators. Given the association 
between poor corporate governance characteristics and accident rates observed in this study, it is 
reasonable to conclude that pilots of airlines with poor corporate governance practices are more 
likely to experience such issues as inadequate training, unfavorable working conditions, 
unreasonable flight schedules, etc. In addition, it is possible that airlines in financial distress and 
airlines with weak corporate governance practices have lower hiring standards, such as requiring 
fewer hours of flight experience. The strategies employed by regulators should, therefore, take 
account of the higher risks attached to airlines that exhibit poor corporate governance practices or 
are in a weak financial state, particularly insofar as these may affect the selection, training, and 
management of pilots. 
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Table 1: Causes of Fatal Accidents by Decade 
This table provides information on the causes of fatal accidents that occurred worldwide from January 1950 to December 
2009 based on information provided by PlaneCrashInfo.com. For accidents with multiple causes, the most prominent cause 
is used. 
 
Cause 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Average 
Pilot Error 50% 53% 49% 42% 49% 50% 57% 50% 
Mechanical Failure 26% 27% 19% 22% 22% 23% 21% 23% 
Weather-Related 15% 7% 10% 14% 7% 8% 10% 10% 
Criminal Activities 4% 4% 9% 12% 8% 9% 8% 8% 
Other  5% 9% 13% 10% 14% 10% 4% 10% 
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Table 2: Definitions of Variables 
This table provides an overview of the explanatory variables used in our subsequent analysis. Panel A provides sources and 
definitions for the firm-level explanatory variables. Panel B provides sources and descriptions for the country-level 
explanatory variables. 
 
Panel A: Firm-level Explanatory Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Avg. Number of Qualifications BoardEx Average number of professional and academic qualifications of directors 
on the board 
Succession Factor BoardEx Measurement of the clustering of directors around retirement age on a 
given date; a lower number represents a higher risk of succession 
Gender Ratio BoardEx Male directors / Total directors 
Board Size BoardEx Number of directors on the board 
Nationality Mix BoardEx Proportion of directors from other (non-domestic) countries 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors BoardEx Standard deviation of the ages of directors for all the directors on a given 
date 
Independent Director Ratio BoardEx Number of outside or supervisory directors / Board size 
Busy Board BoardEx Number of other directorships held by each director of the firm (Average 
across all directors on the board) 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board BoardEx Standard deviation of Busy Board 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire BoardEx Average time to retirement for all directors on a given date, assuming a 
retirement age of 70 
Ln (CEO Tenure) BoardEx Natural logarithm of the airline CEO's tenure on a given date 
Ln (CEO Age) BoardEx Natural logarithm of the airline CEO' age on a given date 
CEO Duality Dummy BoardEx Dummy variable indicating whether or not the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board. Equals one if yes and zero otherwise 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor ICAO database Average of total hours flown / Total days available for each airline's air 
fleet 
Net Profit Margin ICAO database Net income / Total revenue 
Maintenance Ratio ICAO database Flight equipment maintenance and overhaul expense / Total revenue 
Current Ratio ICAO database Current assets / Current liabilities 
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Total Asset Turnover ICAO database Sales / Total assets 
Growth Rate ICAO database ROE * Retention ratio / (1- ROE * Retention ratio) 
Z Score ICAO database Z = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 + 3.25, where 
X1 = Working capital / Total assets, 
X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets, 
X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets, 
X4 = Book value of equity / Book value of total liabilities. 
Operating Revenue  ICAO database Total operating revenue, in billions of dollars 
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Panel B: Country-level Explanatory Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Ln (Departures) World Bank database Natural logarithm of the number of domestic and international airplane 
takeoffs per year in a given country 
Unemployment World Bank database Unemployment rate (in %) 
Efficiency of the Judicial 
System 
La Porta et al. (1998) Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it 
affects business. Scale from zero to ten, with lower scores representing 
lower efficiency levels Rule of Law La Porta et al. (1998) Assessment of the law and order tradition in a given country. Scale from 
zero to ten, with lower scores for a weaker tradition of law and order 
Corruption La Porta et al. (1998) Assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate that 
high government officials are likely to demand special payments and illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government. 
Scale from zero to ten, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption English Origin Dummy Reynolds and Flores 
(1989) 
Dummy variable that identifies whether or not the legal system of a given 
country originates from English common law (1=yes, 0=no) 
Quality of Air-Transport 
Infrastructure 
The World Economic 
Forum (WEF) 
Assessment of the quality of airports in a given country based on data from 
the WEF Executive Opinion Survey. The individual responses are 
aggregated to produce a country score. Scale from zero (underdeveloped) to 
ten (most developed). (We adjusted the scale form its original range which 
went from one to seven) 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Panel A provides summary statistics for all variables used in our study. Panel B reports the mean and median firm-and country-level characteristics for our subsamples of airlines with and 
without accidents during our 1990-2016 sample period. The last two columns of Panel B report p-values for t-tests of differences in means and Wilcoxon tests of differences in medians 
between each subsample. Panel C forms subsamples around the median of each continuous or categorical independent variable and compares the accident rate (i.e., the number of 
accidents per $ billion in revenue) in the below-median vs. above-median subsamples. For binary variables, the subsamples are based directly on the underlying variable values (zero 
or one). 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
77 
Variable Airlines Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Accident 701 0.038 0 0.226 0 5 
Avg. Number of Qualifications 107 1.951 2 0.527 0.4 4 
Succession Factor 107 0.367 0.3 0.171 0 1 
Gender Ratio 107 0.870 0.889 0.110 0.4 1 
Board Size 107 11.514 11 4.791 3 27 
Nationality Mix 107 0.204 0.2 0.217 0 0.8 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors 107 7.297 7.2 2.079 0 14.8 
Independent Director Ratio 107 0.822 0.863 0.134 0 1 
Busy Board 107 2.143 2 0.752 1 4.5 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board 107 1.241 1.2 0.689 0 4.7 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire (Years) 107 10.913 10.5 4.091 2.377 28.5 
CEO Tenure (Years) 107 5.747 4.5 4.491 1.1 26.6 
CEO Age (Years) 107 58.818 60 6.452 40 79.5 
CEO Duality Dummy 107 0.445 0 0.497 0 1 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor  602 7.073 7.1 4.652 0.166 29.4 
Net Profit Margin  701 0.005 0.010 0.078 -0.234 0.271 
Maintenance Ratio 701 0.116 0.106 0.066 0 0.375 
Current Ratio 680 1.133 0.905 0.997 0.044 7.211 
Total Asset Turnover 679 1.631 1.139 1.571 0.211 10.588 
Growth Ratio 651 0.154 0.018 1.362 -3.109 6.968 
Z Score 635 3.691 3.683 2.142 -1.616 10.746 
Operating Revenue ($ Billion) 658 0.766 0.241 1.266 0.001 7.39 
Unemployment Rate (%) 701 7.771 6.7 4.526 0.16 39.3 
Ln (Departures) 701 12.335 12.333 2.173 4.394 16.127 
English Origin Dummy 701 0.387 0 0.487 0 1 
Efficiency of the Judicial System 701 5.889 5.92 1.515 1 8.9 
Corruption 701 6.540 6.32 2.339 1.08 10 
Rule of Law 701 7.219 8.33 2.084 1.58 10 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure 701 7.303 7.85 1.398 2.86 9.77 
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Panel B: Univariate Tests – Characteristics of Firms With/Without Accidents 
 
Airlines with Accidents 
(Firm-Year Observations) 
Airlines without Accidents 
(Firm-Year Observations) 
T-Test Wilcoxon Test 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median p-Value p-Value 
Avg. Number of Qualifications 96 1.937 1.941 890 1.953 2 0.717 0.734 
Succession Factor 95 0.305 0.3 865 0.374 0.3 0.000 0.000 
Gender Ratio 94 0.854 0.846 867 0.872 0.889 0.071 0.010 
Board Size 93 12.568 12 881 11.405 10 0.012 0.000 
Nationality Mix 92 0.170 0.15 851 0.207 0.2 0.074 0.252 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors 96 6.976 7.1 898 7.332 7.2 0.032 0.298 
Independent Director Ratio 95 0.849 0.9 877 0.819 0.857 0.056 0.000 
Busy Board 95 2.234 2.071 894 2.133 2 0.090 0.083 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board 94 1.223 1.2 887 1.243 1.2 0.703 0.534 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire (Years) 96 9.478 8.722 911 11.065 10.65 0.000 0.000 
CEO Tenure (Years) 96 5.478 3.75 986 5.775 4.5 0.537 0.231 
CEO Age (Years) 96 61.253 61.55 910 59.666 59.6 0.021 0.018 
CEO Duality Dummy 93 0.569 1 839 0.431 0 0.012 0.010 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor  131 8.776 8.853 3,578 7.011 7 0.000 0.000 
Net Profit Margin  211 -0.002 0.012 5,924 0.0008 0.009 0.538 1.000 
Maintenance Ratio 211 0.1167 0.102 6,217 0.1166 0.106 0.998 0.906 
Current Ratio 204 0.979 0.795 5,979 1.138 0.909 0.025 0.025 
Total Asset Turnover 207 1.205 0.932 6,001 1.646 1.148 0.000 0.000 
Growth Ratio 170 0.137 0.030 4,830 0.155 0.017 0.857 1.000 
Z Score 197 3.274 3.305 5,402 3.707 3.699 0.005 0.002 
Operating Revenue ($ Billion) 204 0.979 0.795 5,758 0.736 0.228 0.000 0.000 
Unemployment Rate (%) 264 6.944 6.17 6,138 7.807 6.7 0.000 0.031 
Ln (Departures) 270 13.572 13.396 8,136 12.294 12.295 0.000 0.000 
English Origin Dummy 266 0.530 1 8,089 0.382 0 0.000 0.000 
Efficiency of the Judicial System 266 6.059 6.745 8,090 5.884 5.92 0.064 0.182 
Corruption 266 7.069 8.52 8,090 6.522 6.32 0.000 0.001 
Rule of Law 266 7.492 8.57 8,089 7.210 7.8 0.029 0.001 
Qual of Air Tran. Infrastructure 266 7.614 8.26 8,090 7.292 7.85 0.000 0.001 
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Panel C: Univariate Test – The Number of Accidents for Subsamples Based on Different Firm- and Country-Level 
Characteristics 
 








Tests of differences 
Means (p-Value) 
Medians (p-Value) 
Avg. Number of Qualifications ≤ 2 492 
0.123 
0 






Succession Factor ≤ 0.3 194 
0.154 
0 






Gender Ratio ≤ 0.889 458 
0.165 
0 






Board Size ≤ 11 470 
0.072 
0 






Nationality Mix ≤ 0.2 441 
0.138 
0 






Std. Dev. of Age of Directors ≤ 7.2 486 
0.117 
0 



















Busy Board ≤ 2 468 
0.091 
0 






Std. Dev. of Busy Board ≤ 1.2 484 
0.113 
0 




















CEO Tenure ≤ 4.5 Years 498 
0.122 
0 






CEO Age ≤ 60 Years 501 
0.091 
0 






CEO Duality Dummy = 0 516 
0.108 
0 



















Net Profit Margin ≤ 0.010 2,741 
0.050 
0 






Maintenance Ratio ≤ 0.106 3,199 
0.043 
0 






Current Ratio ≤ 0.905 3,083 
0.044 
0 






Total Asset Turnover ≤ 1.139 3,103 
0.054 
0 






Growth Ratio ≤ 0.018 2,500 
0.038 
0 






Z Score ≤ 3.683 2,799 
0.050 
0 






Unemployment Rate ≤ 6.7% 3,316 
0.053 
0 






Ln (Departures) ≤ 12.335 4,204 
0.019 
0 






English Origin Dummy = 0 5,117 
0.026 
0 




















Corruption ≤ 6.32 3,882 
0.029 
0 






Rule of Law ≤ 8.33 4,653 
0.029 
0 





















Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for all pairwise combinations of the independent variables used in our analysis. Correlation coefficients that exceed a threshold of 0.5 in absolute terms 
are marked in bold. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
(1) Avg. Number of 
Qualifications 
1.00                            
(2) Succession Factor 0.10 1.00                           
(3) Gender Ratio -0.08 0.07 1.00                          
(4) Board Size -0.35 -0.19 0.10 1.00                         
(5) Nationality Mix -0.18 0.19 -0.01 0.06 1.00                        
(6) Std. Dev. of Age of 
Directors 
-0.17 0.60 0.24 -0.12 0.04 1.00                       
(7) Independent 
Director Ratio 
0.29 0.05 -0.08 -0.003 -0.19 -0.05 1.00                      
(8) Busy Board 0.18 -0.33 0.06 0.24 -0.01 -0.29 0.09 1.00                     
(9) Std. Dev. of Busy 
Board 
0.25 -0.21 0.18 0.29 0.005 -0.18 0.04 0.79 1.00                    
(10) Avg. Dir. Time to 
Retire 
0.17 0.70 -0.06 -0.13 0.22 0.01 0.07 -0.26 -0.18 1.00                   
(11) Ln (CEO Tenure) 0.11 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 0.26 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 1.00                  
(12) Ln (CEO Age) 0.05 -0.23 0.14 0.14 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 0.24 0.23 -0.37 0.20 1.00                 
(13) CEO Duality 
Dummy 
-0.07 -0.24 0.06 0.37 -0.44 -0.23 0.15 0.14 0.04 -0.06 0.28 0.19 1.00                
(14) Avg. Airline 
Utilization Factor 
0.15 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.23 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.20 -0.002 -0.02 -0.07 1.00               
(15) Net Profit Margin 0.05 0.15 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.17 -0.06 0.09 1.00              
(16) Maintenance 
Ratio 
-0.03 -0.29 0.07 0.03 -0.22 -0.19 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 0.13 0.25 -0.32 -0.14 1.00             
(17) Current Ratio 0.16 0.16 0.16 -0.21 0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.15 -0.09 0.08 0.24 0.05 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 1.00            
(18) Total Asset 
Turnover 
0.21 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.07 0.26 -0.12 -0.07 0.02 -0.17 0.25 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 1.00           
(19) Growth Ratio -0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.13 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.001 0.10 0.08 -0.14 -0.02 0.16 0.29 -0.11 0.09 -0.10 1.00          




-0.06 -0.04 -0.12 0.25 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.17 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.17 -0.15 -0.28 0.11 -0.004 1.00        
(22) Unemployment 
Rate 
0.10 -0.21 -0.11 -0.22 -0.09 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 1.00       
(23) Ln (Departures) 0.33 -0.32 0.08 -0.33 -0.44 -0.09 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.24 0.04 0.06 0.21 -0.20 -0.03 0.37 0.07 -0.03 -0.19 -0.07 -0.14 0.18 1.00      
(24) English Origin 
Dummy 
0.21 -0.20 0.11 -0.38 -0.16 -0.05 -0.22 0.11 0.05 -0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.26 0.02 0.17 0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.04 -0.19 0.18 0.76 1.00     
(25) Efficiency of 
Judicial System 
-0.23 0.04 -0.01 0.40 0.34 -0.05 -0.22 0.05 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.16 0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.31 -0.54 -0.29 1.00    
(26) Corruption -0.21 0.07 -0.05 0.50 0.27 -0.04 0.01 -0.004 0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.07 -0.004 0.28 -0.02 -0.09 -0.13 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.12 -0.30 -0.67 -0.74 0.80 1.00   
(27) Rule of Law -0.02 0.22 -0.09 0.20 0.03 0.12 0.41 -0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.17 -0.15 0.04 0.20 0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.23 0.12 0.06 -0.34 -0.42 -0.68 0.26 0.55 1.00  
(28) Qual. of Air Tran. 
Infrastructure 
0.16 -0.06 -0.12 0.21 -0.29 -0.05 0.36 -0.01 -0.02 -0.003 0.08 -0.01 0.24 0.13 0.03 0.18 -0.07 0.16 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 0.06 -0.40 0.27 0.52 0.57 1.00 
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Table 5: Poisson Regression Results 
This table provides regression results for models in which the log of an airline's number of accidents is regressed on various firm-level corporate governance variables, financial variables, and country-
level variables during our sample period from 1990 to 2016. Panel A reports the regression results for a series of models that consider both our firm- and country-level variables. Models 1 to 5 focus on 
different governance characteristics. Models 6 and 7 focus on firm-level financial variables. In the last column, Model 8, we include all variables together. Panel B reports the regression results related to 
the macroeconomic, institutional, and infrastructure environment of a given country. Each country variable is included separately to observe its individual effect. The results are reported in Models 9 to 16 
in Panel B. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). In the last two rows, we report the number of observations as well as the p-value for a Chi-
square (χ2) test for each regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm-and Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Avg. Number of Qualifications -1.120** -1.074* -0.307 -0.892    -1.297** 
 (0.045) (0.064) (0.626) (0.203)    (0.043) 
Succession Factor -0.719 -0.342 -3.708*     -10.380** 
 (0.536) (0.799) (0.099)     (0.019) 
Gender Ratio -0.959 -0.836      -1.906 
 (0.571) (0.646)      (0.445) 
Board Size -0.008       -0.046 
 (0.837)       (0.568) 
Nationality Mix  -0.246      -1.232 
  (0.844)      (0.447) 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors   0.149     0.600** 
   (0.182)     (0.030) 
Independent Director Ratio   -3.047     4.391 
   (0.116)     (0.115) 
Busy Board    0.762**    0.852** 
    (0.042)    (0.035) 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board    -1.065**    -1.299** 
    (0.016)    (0.032) 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire    -0.051    0.180 
    (0.417)    (0.182) 
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Ln (CEO Tenure)     -0.245   -0.184 
     (0.409)   (0.641) 
Ln (CEO Age)     -0.295   -0.885 
     (0.907)   (0.803) 
CEO Duality Dummy     0.493   0.608 
     (0.240)   (0.424) 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor 0.003 0.037 0.054 0.057 -0.027 0.007 0.007 0.111* 
 (0.953) (0.502) (0.301) (0.295) (0.570) (0.816) (0.780) (0.096) 
Net Profit Margin  -2.320** -2.084** -1.829* -2.265**   -2.186 
  (0.024) (0.038) (0.065) (0.021)   (0.289) 
Maintenance Ratio  -4.305 -4.999* -4.886   -0.139 -8.371*** 
  (0.219) (0.067) (0.146)   (0.938) (0.005) 
Current Ratio      -0.187  -0.195 
      (0.377)  (0.673) 
Total Asset Turnover      -0.203**  -0.967 
      (0.031)  (0.174) 
Growth Ratio      -0.116  -0.133 
      (0.281)  (0.425) 
Z Score      -0.017 -0.090* 0.239 
      (0.870) (0.078) (0.387) 
Operating Revenue 0.239** 0.285*** 0.239** 0.335*** 0.198* 0.237*** 0.270*** 0.381** 
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.026) (0.001) (0.095) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) 
Unemployment Rate -0.334* -0.353** -0.257** -0.360** -0.176 -0.042 -0.020 -0.591** 
 (0.061) (0.042) (0.044) (0.030) (0.278) (0.214) (0.496) (0.013) 
Ln (Departures) 0.338 0.284 0.377 0.177 0.145 0.223*** 0.212** -0.546 
 (0.223) (0.333) (0.224) (0.555) (0.472) (0.008) (0.012) (0.242) 
English Origin Dummy -1.514 -1.418 -2.025* -1.223 -1.078 -0.019 -0.203 0.197 
 (0.144) (0.177) (0.080) (0.242) (0.194) (0.965) (0.631) (0.870) 
Rule of Law -0.979** -1.179*** -0.953** -1.070*** -0.747 -0.172** -0.155** -2.091*** 
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 (0.021) (0.006) (0.028) (0.008) (0.105) (0.048) (0.043) (0.000) 
Constant 6.903 8.206 4.991 7.256 4.879 -4.377*** -4.790*** 26.477 
 (0.212) (0.141) (0.228) (0.118) (0.626) (0.000) (0.000) (0.143) 
         
Observations 416 407 415 431 411 1,417 1,855 273 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Continued on the next page. 
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Panel B: Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Unemployment Rate 0.005       -0.024 
 (0.820)       (0.406) 
Ln (Departures) 0.259*** 0.303*** 0.318*** 0.361*** 0.342*** 0.364*** 0.337*** 0.257*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Origin Dummy   -0.109     0.343 
   (0.552)     (0.155) 
Efficiency of the Judicial System    -0.173***    -0.370*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Corruption     -0.086**   0.086 
     (0.016)   (0.291) 
Rule of Law      -0.118***  -0.180** 
      (0.003)  (0.020) 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure       -0.098* 0.329*** 
       (0.076) (0.004) 
Constant -6.440*** -7.239*** -7.369*** -6.949*** -7.163*** -7.151*** -6.952*** -5.849*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 6,222 8,475 8,355 8,356 8,356 8,355 8,469 6,218 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 6: Poisson Regression Results with Lagged Independent Variables 
To address any endogeneity concerns related to our empirical modelling and to clarify the direction of causality, we re-estimate our Poisson regression using lagged independent firm-level variables. Panel 
A reports the regression results for a series of models that consider both our firm- and country-level variables. Models 1 to 5 focus on different governance characteristics. Models 6 and 7 focus on firm-
level financial variables. In the last column, Model 8, we include all variables together. Panel B reports the regression results related to the macroeconomic, institutional, and infrastructure environment of 
a given country. Each country variable is included separately to observe its individual effect. The results are reported in Models 9 to 16 in Panel B. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the 
corresponding p-value (in parentheses). In the last two rows, we report the number of observations as well as the p-value for a Chi-square (χ2) test for each regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm- and Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Avg. Number of Qualifications Lagged -0.821 -0.698 -0.813 -0.396    0.062 
 (0.181) (0.191) (0.213) (0.476)    (0.925) 
Succession Factor Lagged -0.167 -0.125 -2.694     -7.072 
 (0.905) (0.931) (0.209)     (0.222) 
Gender Ratio Lagged -0.160 -0.354      -2.159 
 (0.914) (0.818)      (0.225) 
Board Size Lagged 0.036       0.114** 
 (0.320)       (0.045) 
Nationality Mix Lagged  -1.658      -3.509** 
  (0.238)      (0.023) 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors Lagged   0.229**     0.308 
   (0.017)     (0.292) 
Independent Director Ratio Lagged   1.404     -0.240 
   (0.346)     (0.907) 
Busy Board Lagged    -0.069    0.040 
    (0.871)    (0.933) 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board Lagged    -0.275    -0.367 
    (0.547)    (0.512) 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire Lagged    -0.135*    0.186 
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    (0.088)    (0.246) 
Ln (CEO Tenure) Lagged     -0.231   -0.900** 
     (0.547)   (0.035) 
Ln (CEO Age) Lagged     2.004   1.942 
     (0.484)   (0.508) 
CEO Duality Dummy Lagged     -0.218   -0.392 
     (0.655)   (0.506) 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor Lagged 0.008 0.028 0.035 0.034 -0.030 -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.862) (0.539) (0.497) (0.464) (0.511) (0.569) (0.487) (0.931) 
Net Profit Margin Lagged  -0.344 -0.065 -0.137 0.023   1.505 
  (0.796) (0.964) (0.913) (0.985)   (0.394) 
Maintenance Ratio Lagged  -1.793 -2.754 -2.356   -0.960 -1.575 
  (0.601) (0.393) (0.461)   (0.549) (0.720) 
Current Ratio Lagged      -0.064  0.096 
      (0.762)  (0.738) 
Total Asset Turnover Lagged      -0.230**  -1.573 
      (0.030)  (0.152) 
Growth Ratio Lagged      0.050  -0.034 
      (0.608)  (0.847) 
Z Score Lagged      -0.066 -0.044 0.138 
      (0.490) (0.327) (0.513) 
Operating Revenue Lagged 0.241** 0.290*** 0.287*** 0.256** 0.236** 0.248*** 0.302*** 0.027 
 (0.030) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.874) 
Unemployment Rate Lagged -0.009 -0.040 -0.070 -0.084 -0.042 0.038 0.032 -0.230 
 (0.947) (0.742) (0.496) (0.382) (0.709) (0.345) (0.403) (0.121) 
Ln (Departures) Lagged 0.207 0.015 0.032 -0.013 0.093 0.170* 0.186** -0.289 
 (0.429) (0.948) (0.881) (0.960) (0.668) (0.055) (0.022) (0.548) 
English Origin Dummy -0.510 -0.442 -0.300 -0.356 -0.753 0.089 0.040 -1.339 
 (0.531) (0.618) (0.693) (0.666) (0.358) (0.854) (0.929) (0.368) 
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Rule of Law -0.308 -0.377 -0.492 -0.369 -0.238 -0.151* -0.171** -1.881*** 
 (0.509) (0.429) (0.245) (0.356) (0.552) (0.083) (0.034) (0.009) 
Constant -1.857 1.851 0.246 3.064 -9.125 -4.195*** -4.655*** 14.756 
 (0.767) (0.755) (0.963) (0.548) (0.493) (0.001) (0.000) (0.375) 
         
Observations 383 380 380 380 381 1,247 1,604 264 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.013) (0.027) (0.003) (0.004) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Panel B: Summary of Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Unemployment Rate Lagged 0.031       -0.002 
 (0.153)       (0.933) 
Ln (Departures) Lagged 0.272*** 0.304*** 0.327*** 0.364*** 0.342*** 0.378*** 0.326*** 0.261*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Origin Dummy   -0.153     0.310 
   (0.435)     (0.249) 
Efficiency of the Judicial System    -0.184***    -0.388*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Corruption     -0.088**   0.118 
     (0.028)   (0.141) 
Rule of Law      -0.140***  -0.226*** 
      (0.000)  (0.001) 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure       -0.077 0.402*** 
       (0.178) (0.000) 
Constant -6.669*** -7.124*** -7.354*** -6.813*** -7.039*** -7.058*** -6.835*** -6.239*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 4,853 6,611 6,561 6,562 6,562 6,561 6,605 4,804 




Table 7: Zero-inflated Poisson Regression Results  
To address the fact that aviation accidents are rare (i.e., our accident dummy registers a large number of zeros), we re-estimate our Poisson regression as a zero-inflated Poisson regression. Panel A reports 
the regression results for a series of models that consider both our firm- and country-level variables. Models 1 to 5 focus on different governance characteristics. Models 6 and 7 focus on firm-level financial 
variables. In the last column, Model 8, we include all variables together. Panel B reports the regression results related to the macroeconomic, institutional, and infrastructure environment of a given country. 
Each country variable is included separately to observe its individual effect. The results are reported in Models 9 to 16 in Panel B. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-
value (in parentheses). In the last two rows, we report the number of observations as well as the p-value for a Chi-square (χ2) test for each regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm- and Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Avg. Number of Qualifications -1.124** -1.080* -0.332 -0.906    -1.320** 
 (0.044) (0.063) (0.591) (0.197)    (0.042) 
Succession Factor -0.703 -0.330 -3.746*     -10.495** 
 (0.546) (0.806) (0.092)     (0.017) 
Gender Ratio -0.944 -0.821      -1.888 
 (0.576) (0.650)      (0.442) 
Board Size -0.007       -0.046 
 (0.847)       (0.561) 
Nationality Mix  -0.227      -1.213 
  (0.854)      (0.446) 
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors   0.158     0.601** 
   (0.156)     (0.028) 
Independent Director Ratio   -2.841     4.416 
   (0.114)     (0.115) 
Busy Board    0.766**    0.860** 
    (0.042)    (0.035) 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board    -1.061**    -1.302** 
    (0.016)    (0.033) 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire    -0.050    0.186 
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    (0.431)    (0.164) 
Ln (CEO Tenure)     -0.245   -0.174 
     (0.471)   (0.661) 
Ln (CEO Age)     -0.300   -0.846 
     (0.905)   (0.810) 
CEO Duality Dummy     0.481   0.590 
     (0.263)   (0.443) 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor 0.002 0.036 0.057 0.055 -0.025 0.015 0.010 0.105 
 (0.963) (0.520) (0.280) (0.306) (0.595) (0.690) (0.699) (0.109) 
Net Profit Margin  -2.320** -2.085** -1.836* -2.285**   -2.168 
  (0.023) (0.040) (0.064) (0.022)   (0.291) 
Maintenance Ratio  -4.237 -5.192* -4.798   -0.183 -8.247*** 
  (0.226) (0.062) (0.154)   (0.918) (0.006) 
Current Ratio      -0.198  -0.208 
      (0.358)  (0.652) 
Total Asset Turnover      -0.205**  -0.959 
      (0.027)  (0.170) 
Growth Ratio      -0.139  -0.138 
      (0.235)  (0.414) 
Z Score      -0.017 -0.094* 0.244 
      (0.872) (0.065) (0.375) 
Operating Revenue 0.239** 0.284*** 0.243** 0.334*** 0.202* 0.259*** 0.282*** 0.375** 
 (0.017) (0.003) (0.022) (0.001) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) 
Unemployment Rate -0.313* -0.330** -0.300** -0.337** -0.223 -0.043 -0.022 -0.552** 
 (0.065) (0.045) (0.030) (0.032) (0.131) (0.199) (0.478) (0.012) 
Ln (Departures) 0.334 0.280 0.376 0.175 0.159 0.240*** 0.222*** -0.539 
 (0.228) (0.338) (0.223) (0.559) (0.442) (0.005) (0.010) (0.241) 
English Origin Dummy -1.474 -1.381 -2.034* -1.193 -1.144 -0.043 -0.226 0.191 
 (0.152) (0.186) (0.078) (0.251) (0.199) (0.918) (0.586) (0.873) 
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Rule of Law -0.936** -1.126*** -1.067** -1.020*** -0.841* -0.184** -0.162** -2.025*** 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.064) (0.038) (0.040) (0.000) 
Constant 6.421 7.643 6.064 6.701 5.938 -3.808*** -4.250*** 25.441 
 (0.224) (0.152) (0.135) (0.134) (0.564) (0.001) (0.001) (0.149) 
         
Observations 416 407 415 431 411 1,417 1,855 273 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Panel B: Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Unemployment Rate 0.003       -0.017 
 (0.902)       (0.556) 
Ln (Departures) 0.258*** 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.363*** 0.348*** 0.365*** 0.342*** 0.261*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Origin Dummy   -0.071     0.347 
   (0.705)     (0.114) 
Efficiency of the Judicial System    -0.176***    -0.337*** 
    (0.000)    (0.002) 
Corruption     -0.095**   0.076 
     (0.013)   (0.370) 
Rule of Law      -0.119***  -0.158** 
      (0.003)  (0.048) 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure       -0.111* 0.279** 
       (0.051) (0.013) 
Constant -4.733*** -5.373*** -5.446*** -5.126*** -5.342*** -5.317*** -5.054*** -4.285*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Observations 6,222 8,475 8,355 8,356 8,356 8,355 8,469 6,218 




Table 8: Random-effects Panel Poisson Regression Results  
To address any potentially omitted variable concerns related to our empirical modelling, we re-run our Poisson regression using a random-effects panel Poisson regression. Panel A reports the regression 
results for a series of models that consider both our firm- and country-level variables. Models 1 to 5 focus on different governance characteristics. Models 6 and 7 focus on firm-level financial variables. 
In the last column, Model 8, we include all variables together. Panel B reports the regression results related to the macroeconomic, institutional, and infrastructure environment of a given country. Each 
country variable is included separately to observe its individual effect. The results are reported in Models 9 to 16 in Panel B. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in 
parentheses). In the last three rows, we report the number of observations, the number of airlines used in each panel as well as the p-value for a Chi-square (χ2) test for each regression. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm- and Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Avg. Number of Qualifications -1.124** -1.081* -0.368 -0.906    -1.320 
 (0.043) (0.063) (0.513) (0.174)    (0.124) 
Succession Factor -0.703 -0.327 -3.495     -10.495* 
 (0.675) (0.861) (0.142)     (0.067) 
Gender Ratio -0.944 -0.818      -1.888 
 (0.664) (0.728)      (0.541) 
Board Size -0.007       -0.046 
 (0.888)       (0.594) 
Nationality Mix  -0.224      -1.213 
  (0.882)      (0.505) 
Std. Dev. ff Age of Directors   0.165     0.601* 
   (0.225)     (0.058) 
Independent Director Ratio   -3.027**     4.416 
   (0.025)     (0.229) 
Busy Board    0.766    0.860 
    (0.126)    (0.197) 
Std. Dev. of Busy Board    -1.061    -1.302 
    (0.136)    (0.194) 
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire    -0.050    0.186 
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    (0.467)    (0.296) 
Ln (CEO Tenure)     -0.238   -0.174 
     (0.432)   (0.711) 
Ln (CEO Age)     -0.291   -0.846 
     (0.888)   (0.789) 
CEO Duality Dummy     0.483   0.590 
     (0.284)   (0.466) 
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor 0.002 0.036 0.052 0.055 -0.025 0.010 0.010 0.105 
 (0.973) (0.624) (0.479) (0.428) (0.721) (0.776) (0.771) (0.254) 
Net Profit Margin  -2.320 -2.070 -1.836 -2.283   -2.168 
  (0.133) (0.175) (0.214) (0.111)   (0.392) 
Maintenance Ratio  -4.245 -5.661 -4.798   -0.881 -8.247* 
  (0.273) (0.110) (0.188)   (0.707) (0.073) 
Current Ratio      -0.123  -0.208 
      (0.642)  (0.669) 
Total Asset Turnover      -0.204  -0.959 
      (0.198)  (0.150) 
Growth Ratio      -0.110  -0.138 
      (0.429)  (0.604) 
Z Score      -0.016 -0.081 0.244 
      (0.869) (0.162) (0.367) 
Operating Revenue 0.239** 0.284** 0.255* 0.334*** 0.202* 0.233*** 0.261*** 0.375* 
 (0.045) (0.020) (0.050) (0.005) (0.082) (0.004) (0.000) (0.057) 
Unemployment Rate -0.313* -0.330* -0.319* -0.337** -0.224 -0.055 -0.040 -0.552** 
 (0.063) (0.056) (0.052) (0.048) (0.120) (0.226) (0.302) (0.029) 
Ln (Departures) 0.334 0.280 0.398 0.175 0.160 0.240** 0.228** -0.539 
 (0.176) (0.308) (0.162) (0.501) (0.483) (0.030) (0.027) (0.273) 
English Origin Dummy -1.474 -1.380 -2.084* -1.193 -1.165 -0.158 -0.316 0.191 
 (0.124) (0.162) (0.064) (0.218) (0.227) (0.709) (0.426) (0.910) 
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Rule of Law -0.936 -1.127* -1.179* -1.020* -0.849* -0.176* -0.170** -2.025** 
 (0.107) (0.070) (0.079) (0.068) (0.086) (0.054) (0.049) (0.026) 
Constant Accident 6.423 7.644 6.916 6.701 5.876 -4.567*** -4.874*** 25.441 
 (0.351) (0.322) (0.299) (0.290) (0.567) (0.000) (0.000) (0.160) 
         
Observations 416 407 415 431 411 1,417 1,855 273 
Number of Panel ID Variables 62 62 62 62 62 285 317 52 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.053) (0.001) (0.001) (0.200) 
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Panel B: Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
         
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Unemployment Rate 0.005       0.002 
 (0.852)       (0.943) 
Ln (Departures) 0.280*** 0.374*** 0.429*** 0.477*** 0.487*** 0.469*** 0.487*** 0.338*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Origin Dummy   -0.359     0.146 
   (0.136)     (0.596) 
Efficiency of Judicial System    -0.266***    -0.122 
    (0.002)    (0.402) 
Corruption     -0.194***   -0.021 
     (0.001)   (0.839) 
Rule of Law      -0.179***  -0.079 
      (0.002)  (0.363) 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure       -0.289*** 0.042 
       (0.001) (0.761) 
Constant Accident -7.001*** -8.454*** -8.997*** -8.211*** -8.658*** -8.370*** -7.796*** -6.678*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Observations 6,222 8,475 8,355 8,356 8,356 8,355 8,469 6,218 
Number of Panel ID Variables 927 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,031 923 




Table 9: Cox Proportional Hazards Model Regression Results  
To further address any methodology-related biasedness and to confirm our original findings in Table 5, we re-run our analysis using a series of Cox Proportional Hazards Model regression. Panel A reports 
the regression results for a series of models that consider both our firm- and country-level variables. Models 1 to 5 focus on different governance characteristics. Models 6 and 7 focus on firm-level financial 
variables. Panel B reports the regression results related to the macroeconomic, institutional, and infrastructure environment of a given country. Each country variable is included separately to observe its 
individual effect. The results are reported in Models 8 to 15 in Panel B. For each variable, we report the coefficient and the corresponding p-value (in parentheses). In the last two rows, we report the 
number of observations as well as the p-value for a Chi-square (χ2) test for each regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm- and Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Avg. Number of Qualifications -0.309 -0.417 -0.353 -0.712    
 (0.680) (0.603) (0.645) (0.533)    
Succession Factor 1.659 2.445 2.875     
 (0.563) (0.495) (0.415)     
Gender Ratio 3.333 1.800      
 (0.459) (0.728)      
Board Size 0.013       
 (0.883)       
Nationality Mix  1.195      
  (0.537)      
Std. Dev. of Age of Directors   -0.151     
   (0.536)     
Independent Director Ratio   -1.690     
   (0.440)     
Busy Board    1.417    
    (0.200)    
Std. Dev. of Busy Board    -1.373    
    (0.325)    
Avg. Dir. Time to Retire    0.081    
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    (0.482)    
Ln (CEO Tenure)     0.255   
     (0.588)   
Ln (CEO Age)     2.133   
     (0.506)   
CEO Duality Dummy     0.040   
     (0.959)   
Avg. Airline Utilization Factor 0.048 0.126 0.139 0.161 0.058 0.027 0.016 
 (0.660) (0.358) (0.239) (0.192) (0.646) (0.527) (0.658) 
Net Profit Margin  -6.219** -6.291** -6.176** -4.680**   
  (0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.029)   
Maintenance Ratio  -9.587 -10.524 -6.974   -0.482 
  (0.212) (0.138) (0.376)   (0.866) 
Current Ratio      0.059  
      (0.854)  
Total Asset Turnover      -0.149  
      (0.362)  
Growth Ratio      -0.066  
      (0.687)  
Z Score      -0.115 -0.104 
      (0.395) (0.190) 
Operating Revenue 0.627*** 0.813*** 0.693*** 0.811*** 0.561*** 0.295** 0.351*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.028) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate -0.174 -0.215 -0.267 -0.412 -0.376 -0.021 -0.008 
 (0.600) (0.535) (0.421) (0.154) (0.294) (0.744) (0.879) 
Ln (Departures) 0.494 0.439 0.553 0.455 0.657 0.377** 0.304** 
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 (0.318) (0.433) (0.290) (0.422) (0.208) (0.017) (0.018) 
English Origin Dummy -2.801 -2.746 -3.523* -2.722 -3.476* -0.695 -0.567 
 (0.123) (0.157) (0.056) (0.164) (0.080) (0.288) (0.311) 
Rule of Law -1.243 -1.543 -1.720 -1.853 -2.260* 0.073 0.008 
 (0.312) (0.249) (0.194) (0.174) (0.090) (0.602) (0.946) 
Observations 300 292 299 310 297 1,125 1,489 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.181) (0.072) (0.055) (0.051) (0.064) (0.011) (0.003) 
 




Continued from the previous page. 
 
Panel B: Country-Level Results (DV=Number of Accidents) 
VARIABLES Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Unemployment Rate 0.019       0.010 
 (0.544)       (0.778) 
Ln (Departures) 0.184*** 0.201*** 0.132** 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.129** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) 
English Origin Dummy   0.395*     0.317 
   (0.091)     (0.249) 
Efficiency of the Judicial System   
 
0.052    -0.088 
   
 
(0.497)    (0.558) 
Corruption    
 
0.067   0.193* 
    
 
(0.188)   (0.057) 
Rule of Law     
 
-0.016  -0.183* 
     
 
(0.774)  (0.053) 
Qual. of Air Tran. Infrastructure      
 
0.005 0.045 
      
 
(0.949) (0.751) 
Observations 5,308 7,505 7,418 7,419 7,419 7,418 7,499 5,304 
χ2 Test (p-value) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
 
 
